Notes for Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari What Is Philosophy?

Key concepts: Autochthon, brain, concept, conceptual personae, diagrammatic, friend, geophilosophy, intensive, nonconceptual understanding, Omnitudo, planomenon.


Related theorists: Bogost, Descartes, Bruce Janz, Latour, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Peguy, Plato, Spinoza, Ulmer, Jean-Pierre Vernant.


Introduction: The Question Then …
(1-2) There are times when old age produces not eternal youth but a sovereign freedom, a pure necessity in which one enjoys a moment of grace between life and death, and in which all the parts of the machine come together to send into the future a feature that cuts across all ages: Titian, Turner, Monet.
(2) We cannot claim such a state. Simply, the time has come for us to ask what philosophy is. We have never stopped asking this question previously, and we have already had the answer, which has not changed:
philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.
(2-3) We will see that concepts need
conceptual personae [personnages conceptuels] that play a part of their definition. Friend is one such persona that is even said to reveal the Greek origin of philo-sophy: other civilizations had sages, but the Greeks introduce these “friends” who are not just more modest sages.
(3-4) What does
friend mean when it becomes a conceptual persona, or a condition for the exercise of thought?

Programming creates runtime phenomena that are more than products, such as languages and other machines that autonomously build other things, the way philosophy creates concepts, valorizing those who eat their dogfood; fitting that Nietzsche is invoked, suggesting Bogost, also invoked by Kittler and others for being aware of how such activity in turn affects the humans performing it.

(5-6) The philosopher is the concept's friend; he is potentiality of the concept. That is, philosophy is not a simple art of forming, inventing, or fabricating concepts, because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products. More rigorously, philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts. . . . Nietzsche laid down the task of philosophy when he wrote, “[Philosophers] must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them.” . . . What would be the value of a philosopher of whom one could say, “He has created no concepts; he has not creating his own concepts?”

Compare these questions interrogating concepts to the horse versus donkey by misinformed friend versus enemy example in Plato.

(9) We known, however, that the friend or lover, as claimant, does not lack rivals. . . . How, then, is the false friend to be distinguished from the true friend, the concept from the simulacrum?

Attack on computer science as among shallow, late, universal capitalist endeavors of age of commercial professional training fits with critical tone of Deleuze Postscript and dismissiveness of Derrida and Zizek: Ulmerian concepts and my flossification, short lines, and Heideggerian meditations on electronic devices aim to escape this critique by animating creative multipurposive (choric) making.

(10-11) In successive challenges, philosophy confronted increasingly insolent and calamitous rivals that Plato himself would never have imagined in his most comic moments. Finally, the most shameful moment came when computer science, marketing, design, and advertising, all the disciplines of communications, seized hold of the word concept itself and said: “This is our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the ideas men! We are the friends of the concept, we put it in our computers.. . . But the more philosophy comes up against shameless and inane rivals and encounters them at its very core, the more it feels driven to fulfill the task of creating concepts that are aerolites rather than commercial products.

Periodization theory for concepts is sequence encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training.

(12) If the three ages of the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the disaster of the third—an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism.


Part One
Philosophy

1. What is a Concept?
(15) There are no simple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by them. It therefore has a combination [
chiffre].
(18) In short, we say that every concept always has a
history, even though this history zigzags, though it passes, if need be, through other problems or onto different planes.
(18) On the other hand, a concept also has a
becoming that involves its relationship with concepts situated on the same plane.
(19) Second, what is distinctive about the concept is that it renders components inseparable
within itself.

Concepts combination of internally inseparable components, processual.

(20) Third, each concept will therefore be considered as the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of its own components. . . . They are processual, modular. . . . The concept is in a state of survey [survol] in relation to its components, endlessly traversing them according to an order without distance.
(21) The concept speaks the event, not the essence of the thing—pure Event, a hecceity, an entity: the event of the Other or the face (when, in turn, the face is taken as concept). It is like the bird as event. The concept is defined by
the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed.
(22) Finally, the concept is not discursive, and philosophy is not a discursive formation, because it does not link propositions together.
(24) In the case of propositions, proper names designate extrinsic
partial observers that are scientifically definable in relation to a particular axis of reference; whereas for concepts, proper names are intrinsic conceptual personae who haunt a particular plane of consistency. It is not only proper names that are used very differently in philosophies, sciences, and arts but also syntactical elements, and especially prepositions and the conjunctions, “now,” “therefore.” Philosophy proceeds by sentences, but it is not always propositions that are extracted from sentences in general.

EXAMPLE 1
(24) To start with, the preceding analysis must be confirmed by taking the example of one of the best-known signed philosophical concepts, that of the Cartesian cogito, Descartes's
I: a concept of self.
(27-28) Cartestian concepts can only be assessed as a function of their problems and their plane. In general, if earlier concepts were able to prepare a concept but not constitute it, it is because their problem was still trapped within other problems, and their plane did not yet possess its indispensable curvature or movements. . . . If one concept is “better” than an earlier one, it is because it makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carriers out unforeseen cuttings-out, it brings forth an Event that surveys [
survole] us. . . . What is the best way to follow the great philosophers? Is it to repeat what they said or to do what they did, that is, create concepts for problems that necessarily change?

From first example of Cartesian concepts, propose philosophers who do not create are inspired only by ressentiment, flip side of shallow capitalist content creators who usurped the concept.

(28-29) To criticize is only to establish that a concept vanishes when it is thrust into a new milieu, losing some of its components, or acquiring others that transform it. But those who criticize without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy. All these debates and communicators are inspired by ressentiment. . . . In fact, Socrates constantly made all discussion impossible, both in the short form of the contest of questions and answers an in the long form of a rivalry between discourses.

EXAMPLE 2
(29) The
Parmenides shows the extent to which Plato is master of the concept.
(30) So long as the preexistence of the Idea remains (even in the Christian form of archetypes in God's understanding), the cogito could be prepared but not fully accomplished. For Descartes to create this concept, the meaning of “first” must undergo a remarkable change, take on a subjective meaning; and all difference of time between the idea and the soul that forms it as subject must be annulled (hence the importance of Descartes's point against reminiscence, in which he says that innate ideas do not exist “before” but “at the same time” as the soul).
(31) Suppose a component is added to a concept: the concept will probably break up or undergo a complete change involving, perhaps, another plane—at any rate, other problems. This is what happens with the Kantian cogito. . . . Kant demands the introduction of a new component into the cogito, the one Descartes repressed—time.
(32) The history of philosophy means that we evaluate not only the historical novelty of the concepts created by a philosopher but also the power of their becoming when they pass into one another.
(33) The concept is obviously knowledge—but knowledge of itself, and what it knows is the pure event, which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is embodied.

From second example of Plato Parmenides confirming a physical world effect results from the programming seems dismissed as legitimate humanities scholarship by Deleuze and Guattari when they dismiss need for empirical verifications of philosophical concepts; philosophical concepts set up events that are not confirmatory but totalizing in their interpretation, yet how does this statement cohere with awkwardness of illustrating postmodern concepts?

(33-34) Science needs only propositions or functions, whereas philosophy, for its part, does not need to invoke a lived that would give only a ghostly and extrinsic life to secondary, bloodless concepts. The philosophical concept does not refer to the lived, by way of compensation, but consists, through its own creation, in setting up an event that surveys the whole of the lived no less than every state of affairs. Every concept shapes and reshapes the event in its own way. The greatness of a philosophy is measured by the nature of the events to which its concepts summon us or that it enables us to release in concepts.


2. The Plane of Immanence

Beautifully stated description of resonant thrown assembly of philosophical concepts One-All Omnitudo plane of consistency planomenon that again sounds like the dynamic computing operating environment of a running system; programming and system engineering creates a milieu that satisfies the infinite speed criterion like human thought of Epicurus, Spinoza, and other philosophers.

(35-36) Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one another so that they fit together, because their edges do not match up. They are not pieces of a jigsaw but rather the outcome of throws of the dice. They resonate nonetheless, and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a powerful Whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented: an unlimited One-All, an “Omnitudo” that includes all the concepts on one and the same plane. It is a table, a plateau, or a slice; it is a plane of consistency or, more accurately, the plane of immanence of concepts, the planomenon. . . . Philosophy is a constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively different complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the layout out of a plane. . . . From Epicurus to Spinoza (the incredible book 5) and from Spinoza to Michaux the problem of thought is infinite speed. But this speed requires a milieu that moves infinitely in itself—the plane, the void, the horizon.

Plane is operating environment, concepts machine phenomena.

(36) Concepts are concrete assemblages, like the configurations of a machine, but the plane is the abstract machine of which these assemblages are the working parts.

Compare plane of immanence to thought in Heidegger WICT, searching for enduring qualities of thought while recognizing their situatedness.

(37) The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one's bearings in thought. . . . Are contemplating, reflecting, or communicating anything more than opinions held about thought at a particular time and in a particular civilization? The image of thought retains only what thought can claim by right. Thought demands “only” movement that can be carried to infinitely.

Fractal curvative phenomenon; if three period differences of thought and being may map on orality, literacy, what is plane in age of computing?

(38-39) If “turning toward” is the movement of thought toward truth, how could truth not also turn toward thought? And how could truth itself not turn away from thought when thought turns away from it? However, this is not a fusion but a reversibility, an immediate, perpetual, instantaneous exchange—a lightning flash. . . . The plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, as Nous and as Physis. . . . Diverse movements of the infinite are so mixed in with each other that, far from breaking up the One-All of the plane of immanence, they constitute its variable curvature, its concavities and convexities, its fractal nature as it were. It is this fractal nature that makes the planomenon an infinite that is always different from any surface or volume determinable as a concept. . . . The plane is certainly not the same in the time of the Greeks, in the seventeenth century, and today (and these are still vague and general terms); there is neither the same image of thought nor the same substance of being.

Diagrammatic and intensive features both influenced by text derived from: is this a bias even in electracy?

(39-40) But in reality, elements of the plane are diagrammatic features, whereas concepts are intensive features. . . . The grandiose Leibnizian or Bergsonian perspective that every philosophy depends upon an intuition that its concepts constantly develop through slight differences of intensity is justified if intuition is thought of as the envelopment of infinite movements of thought that constantly pass through a plane of immanence. . . . Intensive features are never the consequence of diagrammatic features, and intensive ordinates are not deduced from movements or directions. Their correspondence goes beyond even simple resonances and introduces instances adjunct to the creation of concepts, namely, conceptual personae.

Prephilosophical internal conditions imply nonphilosophical opens for technology, and meets back in critical programming; per Hayles nonconceptual understanding extends beyond intuition into technological nonconscious, such as the boundary between languages and protocols managed by compilers, interpreters, parsers, operating systems.

(40-41) If philosophy begins with the creation of concepts, then the plane of immanence must be regarded as prephilosophical. It is presupposed not in the way that one concept may refer to others but in the way that concepts themselves refer to a nonconceptual understanding. . . . Prephilosophical does not mean something preexistent but rather something that does not exist outside philosophy, although philosophy presupposes it. These are its internal conditions. The nonphilosophical is perhaps closer to the heart of philosophy than philosophy itself, and this means that philosophy cannot be content to be understood only philosophically or conceptually, but is addressed essentially to nonphilosophers as well.

Returning with bloodshot eyes suggests Bogost carpentry as groping experimentation like dreams inspiring Descartes, back to Alcibiades drunken speech in Symposium, draft Socrates explored according to Heidegger: thinking things descending to becoming animal, particle true of artificial intelligence, too.

(41-42) Precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and does not immediately take effect with concepts, it implies a sort of groping experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational, or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess. We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind. . . . This is because one does not think without becoming something else, something that does not think—an animal, a molecule, a particle—and that comes back to thought and revives it.
(42) The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect chaos has as much a mental as physical existence).
To give consistency without losing anything of the infinite is very different from the problem of science. . . . By making a section of chaos, the plane of immanence requires a creation of concepts.

What do we do today with electracy, where previously philosophy was reterritorialized?

(43) Jean-Pierre Vernant adds a second answer: the Greeks were the first to conceive of a strict immanence of Order to a cosmic milieu that sections chaos in the form of a plane. . . . In short, the first philosophers are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieve stretched over the chaos.

EXAMPLE 3
(44) Can the entire history of philosophy be presented from the viewpoint of the instituting of a plane of immanence?
(45) In any case, whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent
to Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the transcendent.
(46) Beginning with Descartes, and then with Kant and Husserl, the cogito makes it possible to treat the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness. . . . The Greek world that belonged to no one increasingly becomes the property of a Christian consciousness.
(46-47) Yet one more step: when immanence becomes immanent “to” a transcendental subjectivity, it is at the heart of its own field that the hallmark or figure [
chiffre] of a transcendence must appear as action now referring to another self, to another consciousness (communication). . . . No longer content with handing over immanence to the transcendent, we want it to discharge it, reproduce it, and fabricate it itself. . . . The three sorts of Universals—contemplation, reflection, and communication—are like three philosophical eras—Eidetic, Critical, and Phenomenological—inseparable from the long history of an illusion.

Subject as habit in third example.

(48) Empiricism knows only events and other people and is therefore a great creator of concepts. Its force begins from the moment it defines the subject: a habitus, a habit, nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the habit of saying I.

Spinoza is the optimal thinker as Christ of philosophers showing possibility of the impossible.

(48-49) Spinoza is the vertigo of immanence from which so many philosophers try in vain to escape. Will we ever be mature enough for a Spinozist inspiration? It happened once with Bergson: the beginning of Matter and Memory marks out a plane that slices through the chaos.
(49) The plane is surrounded by illusions. These are not abstract misinterpretations or just external pressures but rather thought's mirages. . . . We must draw up a list of these illusions and take their measure, just as Nietzsche, following Spinoza, listed the “four great errors.” But the list is infinite.

Openness of planes of immanence to diffract especially their creators.

(51) In the end, does not every great philosopher lay out a new plane of immanence, introduce a new substance of being and draw up a new image of thought, so that there could not be two great philosophers of the same plane? . . . That is why every plane is not only interleaved but holed, letting through the fogs that surround it, and in which the philosopher who laid it out is in danger of being the first to lose himself.

EXAMPLE 4

Fourth example alludes to Latour hybrids.

(54) When the distribution of what is due to thought by right changes, what changes from one plane of immanence to another are not only the positive and negative features but also the ambiguous features that may become increasingly numerous and that are no longer restricted to folding in accordance with a vectorial opposition of movements.

Invites consideration of digital media portraits in critique of Tinguely philosophical imagings (Ulmer leans toward aesthetic trace over circuitry and programming); wishes machinic portrait of Kant was world productive, but requires human perception to run like software (Manovich, Chun).

(55-56) The history of philosophy is comparable to the art of the portrait. It is not a matter of “making lifelike,” that is, of repeating what a philosopher said but rather of producing resemblance by separating out both the plane of immanence he instituted and the new concepts he created. These are mental, noetic, and machinic portraits. Although they are usually created with philosophical tools, they can also be produced aesthetically. . . . Perhaps more attention should be given to the plane of immanence laid out as abstract machine and to created concepts as parts of the machine. In this sense we could imagine a machinic portrait of Kant, illusions included (see schema).
(59) Philosophical time is thus a grandiose time of coexistence that does not exclude the before and after but
superimposes them in a stratigraphic order. It is an infinite becoming of philosophy that crosscuts its history without being confused with it. . . . Philosophy is becoming, not history it is the coexistence of planes, not the succession of systems.

Compare elevation of Spinoza as Christ of philosophers to elevation of Socrates by Heidegger.

(59-60) We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought. It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it. . . . Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not external and the not-internal inside—that which cannot be thought and yet must be thought, which was thought once, as Christ was incarnated once, in order to show, that one time, the possibility of the impossible. Thus Spinoza is the Christ of philosophers, and the greatest philosophers are hardly more than apostles who distance themselves from or draw near to this mystery.


3. Conceptual Personae

EXAMPLE 5

Fifth example of idiot as conceptual persona transforming from Christian to Russian context.

(60-61) Although Descartes's cogito is created as a concept, it has presuppositions. . . . In the present case it is the Idiot: it is the Idiot who says “I” and sets up the cogito but who also has the subjective presuppositions or lays out the plane. . . . The idiot is a conceptual persona.
(62) It is Chestov who finds in Dostoyevski the power of a new opposition between private thinker and public teacher. . . . The old idiot wanted truth, but the new idiot wants to turn the absurd into the highest power of thought—in other words, to create.
(64) The conceptual persona is not the philosopher's representative but, rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual persona and of all the other personae who are the intercessors [
inercesseurs], the real subjects of his philosophy.
(65) Here, again, it is Plato who begins: he becomes Socrates at the same time that he makes Socrates become philosopher.
(67-68) There is all the more reason for saying that conceptual personae (and also aesthetic figures) are irreducible to
psychoscial types, even if there again there are constant penetrations. . . . We believe that psychosocial types have this meaning: to make perceptible, in the most insignificant or most important circumstances, the formation of territories, the vectors of deterritorialization, and the process of reterritorialization.
(69) Conceptual personae are thinkers, solely thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the diagrammatic features of thought and the intensive features of concepts.

Surfer the new conceptual persona for thinker that was once Cartesian (Berry); enumerates juridical, existential features.

(71) And if today our sports are completely changing, if the old energy-producing activities are giving way to exercises that, on the contrary, insert themselves on existing energetic networks, this is not just a change in the type but yet other dynamic features that enter a thought that “slides” with new substances of being, with wave or snow, and turn the thinker into a sort of surfer as conceptual persona: we renounce then the energetic value of the sporting type in order to pick out the pure dynamic difference expressed in a new conceptual persona.

Existential feature with specificity like stocking-suspender gizmo invented by Kant.

(72) And there are existential features: Nietzsche said that philosophy invents modes of existence or possibilities of life. . . . It will be argued that most philosophers' lives are very bourgeois: but is not Kant's stocking-suspender a vital anecdote appropriate to the system of Reason?

EXAMPLE 6
(73) Even illusions of transcendence use useful to us and provide vital anecdotes—for when we take pride in encountering the transcendent within immanence, all we do is recharge the plane of immanence with immanence itself.

Sixth example enumerates philosophical trinity of laying out, inventing, creating as diagrammatic, personalistic, intensive featuers; coadaptation as taste.

(76-77) Philosophy presents three elements, each of which fits with the other two but must be considered for itself: the prephilosophical plane it must lay out (immanence), the persona or personae it must invent and bring to life (insistence), and the philosophical concepts it must create (consistency). Laying out, inventing, and creating constitute the philosophical trinity—diagrammatic, personalistic, and intensive features.
(77) Since none of these elements are deduced from the others, there must be coadaptation of the three. The philosophical faculty of coadaptation, which also regulates the creation of concepts, is called
taste.
(80-81) The concept is indeed a solution, but the problem to which it corresponds lies in its intensional conditions of consistency and not, as in science, in the conditions of reference of extensional propositions. If the concept is a solution, the conditions of the philosophical problem are found on the plane of immanence presupposed by the concept (to what infinite movement does it refer in the image of thought?), and the unknowns of the problem are found in the conceptual personae that it calls up (what persona, exactly?).
(82) Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure. Now, this cannot be known before being constructed.


4. Geophilosophy

Stored program concept embodies story cast in human terms of Stranger and Autochthon: thought better related to territory and earth, states and cities, than subject and object. Another quick pass through philosophy by naming thinkers and their concepts.

(86) Subject and object give a poor approximation of thought. Thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other. Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth. . . . Husserl demands a ground for thought as original intuition, which is like the earth inasmuch as it neither moves nor is at rest. . . . Territory and earth are two components with two zones of indiscernibility—deterritorialization (from territory to the earth) and reterritorialization (from earth to territory).
(86) The
imperium spatium of the State and the political extensio of the city are not so much forms of a territorial principle as a deterritorialization that takes place on the spot when the State appropriates the territory of local groups or when the city turns its back on its hinterland. In one case, there is reterritorialization on the palace and its supplies; and in the other, on the agora and commercial networks.
(86) The territory has become desert earth, but a celestial Stranger arrives to reestablish the territory or reterritorialize the earth. In the city, by contrast, deterritorialization takes place through immanence: it frees an
Autochthon, that is to say, a power of the earth that follows a maritime component that goes under the sea to reestablish the territory (the Erechtheum, temple of Athena and Poseidon).

International market.

(87-88) Rather than establish themselves in the pores of the empires, they are steeped in a new component; they develop a particular mode of deterritorialization that proceeds by immanence; they form a milieu of immanence. . . . We constantly rediscover these three Greek features: immanence, friendship, and opinion.

Thinking through figures that are paradigmatic, projective, hierarchical, referential.

(89) Thinking here implies a projection of the transcendent on the plane of immanence. . . . It is only from this point of view that Chinese hexagrams, Hindu mandalas, Jewish sephiroth, Islamic “imaginals,” and Christian icons can be considered together: thinking through figures. . . . In short, the figure is essentially paradigmatic, projective, hierarchical, and referential.

Neighborhood rule.

(90-91) The concept's only rule is internal or external neighborhood. . . . What concept should be put alongside a former concept, and what components should be put in each? These are the questions of the creation of concepts. . . . The concept is not paradigmatic but syntagmatic; not projective but connective; not hierarchical but linking; not referential but consistent.

Endnote connects Janz on African philosophy, extend to computing.

(91 footnote 5) Today, by freeing themselves from Hegelian or Heideggerian stereotypes, certain authors are taking up the specifically philosophical question on new foundations: on a Jewish philosophy . . . on an Islamic philosophy . . . and on a Japanese philosophy.

Beautifully put version of McLuhan and Kittler on role of media in human experience, evolving paradigms of perceptibility to reach three figures of objectality, subject, intersubjectivity.

(91-92) Must we conclude from this that there is a radical opposition between figures and concepts? . . . And yet disturbing affinities appear on what seems to be a common plane of immanence. . . . All that can be said is that figures tend toward concepts to the point of drawing infinitely near to them. From the fifteenth to the seventheenth century, Christianity made the impresa the envelope of a “concetto,” but the concetto has not yet acquired consistency and depends upon the way in which it is figured or even dissimulated. . . . Problems begin only afterward, when the atheism of the concept has been attained. . . . The three figures of philosophy are objectality of contemplation, subject of reflection, and intersubjectivity of communication.
(93) The birth of philosophy required an
encounter between the Greek milieu and the plane of immanence of thought. . . . The encounter between friend and thought was needed. In short, philosophy does have a principle, but it is a synthetic and contingent principle—an encounter, a conjunction.

EXAMPLE 7

Seventh example asks why so much about Greece, then, if it is pointless to try to link philosophy to it?

(94) It is pointless to seek, like Hegel or Heidegger, an analytic and necessary principle that would link philosophy to Greece.
(95) However close he got to it, Heidegger betrays the movement of deterritorialization because he fixes it once and for all between being and beings, between the Greek territory and the Western earth that the Greeks would have called Being.
(96) Philosophy cannot be reduced to its own history, because it continually wrests itself from this history in order to create new concepts that fall back into history but do not come from it.

Capitalism in West for behaving like an cybernetic mechanism, optimizing compiler, today interoperating protocols (Galloway).

(97-98) Why capitalism in the West rather than in China of the third or even the eighth century? Because the West slowly brings together and adjusts these components, whereas the East prevents them from reaching fruition. Only the West extends and propagates its centers of immanence. . . . democratic imperialism, colonizing democracy. . . . Modern philosophy's link with capitalism, therefore, is of the same kind as that of ancient philosophy with Greece: the connection of an absolute plane of immanence with a relative social milieu that also functions through immanence.

Man of capitalism is plebian Ulysses, nomad.

(98) Capitalism reactivates the Greek world on these economic, political, and social bases. It is the new Athens. The man of capitalism is not Robinson but Ulysses, the cunning plebian, some average man or other living in the big towns, Autochthonous Proletarians or foreign Migrants who throw themselves into infinite movement—revolution.

FLOSS connection in types of utopias (Harper; Janseik).

(99-100) It is therefore closer to what Adorno called “negative dialectic” and to what the Frankfurt School called “utopian.” Actually, utopia is what links philosophy with its own epoch, with European capitalism, but also already with the Greek city. . . . Erewhon, the word used by Samuel Butler, refers not only to no-where but also to now-here. . . . In utopia (as in philosophy) there is always the risk of a restoration, and sometimes a proud affirmation, of transcendence, so that we need to distinguish between authoritarian utopias, or utopias of transcendence, and immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopias. . . . The word utopia therefore designates that conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu—political philosophy.
(100-101) The concept frees immanence from all the limits still imposed on it by capital (or that is imposed on itself in the form of capital appearing as something transcendent). . . . Revolution is absolute deterritorialization even to the point where this calls for a new earth, a new people.
(101) Absolute deterritorialization does not take place without reterritorialization. Philosophy is reterritorialized on the concept. . . . We today possess concepts, but the Greeks did not yet possess them; they possessed the plane that we no longer possess. . . . This is what Holderlin expressed so profoundly: the “Autochthon” for the Greeks is our “stranger,” that which we have to acquire, whereas our Autochthon is what, to the contrary, the Greeks had to acquire as their stranger.

FLOSS again is a place this reterritorialization of philosophy on modern democracy happens (Harper; Tanaki-Ishii); credit Nietzsche for geophilosophy.

(102) Can we say that philosophy is reterritorialized on the modern democratic State and human rights? . . . In fact, it is not only the philosopher, as man, who has a nation; it is philosophy that is reterritorialized on the national State and the spirit of the people (usually those of the philosopher, but not always). Thus Nietzsche founded geophilosophy by seeking to determine the national characteristics of French, English, and German philosophy.

Present was concepts; now we have software and circuits.

(103-104) The present form is expressed thus: we have concepts! . . . In each case philosophy finds a way of reterritorializing itself in the modern world in conformity with the spirit of a people and its conception of right.

EXAMPLE 8

Eighth example examines national philosophical preferences, habits constituting concepts: French landowners cultivating cogito, Germans seeking absolute foundations in reconquering Greek plane, English nomadizing.

(104) The French are like landowners whose source of income is the cogito. They are always reterritorialized on consciousness. Germany, on the other hand, does not give up the absolute: it makes use of consciousness but as a means of deterritorialization. It wants to reconquer the Greek plane of immanence, the unknown earth that it now feels as its own barbarism, its own anarchy abandoned to the nomads since the disappearance of the Greeks.
(105-106) The English nomadize over the old Greek earth, broken up, fractalized, and extended to the entire universe. . . . In the trinity Founding-Building-Inhabiting, the French build and the Germans lay foundations, but the English inhabit. . . . Wherever there are habits there are concepts, and habits are developed and given up on the plane of immanence of radical experience: they are “conventions.” That is why English philosophy is a free and wild creation of concepts. To what convention is a given proposition due; what is the habit that constitutes its concept? This is the question posed by pragmatism.

There is only the market is universal in capitalism; philosophy and thought shift from Greek friendship, including feeling of shame.

(106-107) If there is no universal democratic State, despite German philosophy's dream of foundation, it is because the market is the only thing that is universal in capitalism. . . . Now, models of realization may be very diverse (democratic, dictatorial, totalitarian), they may be really heterogeneous, but they are nonetheless isomorphous with regard to the world market insofar as the latter not only presupposes but produces determinate inequalities of development. . . . It is not only our States but each of us, every democrat, who finds him or herself not responsible for Nazism but sullied by it. . . . We are no longer Greeks, and friendship is no longer the same: Blanchot and Mascolo have seen the importance of this mutation for thought itself.
(107-108) We also experience it in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation of these modes of existence and of thought-for-the-market, and before the values, ideals, and opinions of our time. . . . This feeling of shame is one of philosophy's most powerful motifs. We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before them.

Seduction of interfaces; too much communication, not enough creation, resistance to the present, for example of Heidegger losing his path in smooth spaces of Nazism; becoming animal, stranger.

(108-109) We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. . . . The Heidegger affair has complicated matters: a great philosopher actually had to be reterritorialized on Nazism for the strangest commentaries to meet up, sometimes calling his philosophy into question and sometimes absolving it through such complicated and convoluted arguments that we are still in the dark. . . . Heidegger lost his way along the paths of the reterritorializations because they are paths without directive signs or barriers. . . . It is a question of becoming. The Thinker is not acephalic, aphasic, but becomes so. . . . We think and write for animals themselves. We become animal so that the animal also becomes something else. . . . This is the constitutive relationship of philosophy with nonphilosophy.

Reterritorialization of philosophy on future should include cyborgs and machine intelligences.

(110) Becoming stranger to onself, to one's language and nation, is not this the peculiarity of the philosopher and philosophy, their “style,” or what is called a philosophical gobbledygook? In short, philosophy is reterritorialized three times: on the Greeks in the past, on the democratic State in the present, and on the new people and earth in the future. Greeks and democrats are strangely deformed in this mirror of the future.
(111) Without history experimentation would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but experimentation is not historical. It is philosophical.

EXAMPLE 9

Ninth example of two ways of considering event by Peguy, history and diagnosis of becomings.

(111-113) In a great work of philosophy, Peguy explains that there are two ways of considering the event. One consists in going over the course of the event, in recording its effectuation in history, its conditioning and deterioration in history. But the other consists in reassembling the event, installing oneself in it as in a becoming, becoming young again and aging in it, both at the same time, going through all its components or singularities. . . . Again, is this not what Foucault called the Actual? . . . We must distinguish not only the share that belongs to the past and the one that belongs to the present but, more profoundly, the share that belongs to the present and that belonging to the actual. . . . The diagnosis of becomings in every passing present is what Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as physician, “physician of civilization,” or inventor of new immanent modes of existence. . . . The Aternal, the Untimely, the Actual are examples of concepts in philosophy; exemplary concepts. . . . (the Temporally eternal in Peguy, the Eternity of becoming to Nietzsche, and the Outside-interior with Foucault).


Part Two
Philosophy, Science, Logic, and Art

5. Functives and Concepts
(117) The object of science is not concepts but rather functions that are presented as propositions in discursive systems. The elements of functions are called
functives. A scientific notion is defined not by concepts but by functions or propositions.

Apply endoreference exoreference distinction of bodies and things to networks.

(123) The difference between body and state of affairs (or thing) pertains to the individuation of the body, which proceeds by a cascade of actualizations. With bodies, the relationship between independent variables becomes fully worked out, even if it means providing itself with a potential or power that renews its individuation. Particularly when the body is a living being, which proceeds by differentiation and no longer by extension or addition, a new type of variable arises, internal variables determining specifically biological functions in relation to internal milieus (endoreference) but also entering into probabilistic functions with external variables of the outside milieu (exoreference).


6. Prospects and Concepts

()

Does philosophy likewise now need technology as it once always melded with neighboring science and originally rhetoric?

(162) If philosophy has a fundamental need for the science that is contemporary with it, this is because science constantly intersects with the possibility of concepts and because concepts necessarily involve allusions to science that are neither examples nor applications, nor even reflections.


7. Percept, Affect, and Concept

Not dismissing computing and writing for being likened to drugs invites critical programming studies, and even if likened to drugs processed the same way Derrida handles his own computer.

(165) The question of whether drugs help the artist to create these beings of sensation, whether they are part of art's internal means that really lead us to the “doors of perception” and reveal to us percepts and affects, is given a general answer inasmuch as drug-induced compounds are usually extraordinarily flaky, unable to preserve themselves, and break up as soon as they are made or looked at.

()


Conclusion: From Chaos to the Brain

Media as opinion is like the quantification leaving machine cognition to pushing it around.

(203) It is as if the struggle against chaos does not take place without an affinity with the enemy, because another struggle develops and takes on more importance—the struggles against opinion, which claims to protect us from chaos itself.
(204) Art indeed struggles with chaos, but it does so in order to bring forth a vision that illuminates it for an instant, a Sensation.
(206-207) Art takes a bit of chaos in a frame in order to form a composed chaos that becomes sensory, or from which it extracts a chaoid sensation as variety; but science takes a bit of chaos in a system of coordinates and forms a referenced chaos that becomes Nature, and from which it extracts an aleatory function and chaoid variables. . . . Creation is the aesthetic varieties or scientific variables that emerge on a plane that is able to crosscut chaotic variability.

Is reality, brain as junction not unity, sustenance of three daughters of chaos art, science, philosophy another human PHI (thought, intuition) asymptotically instantiating machine computing?

(207-208) Philosophy struggles in turn with the chaos as undifferentiated abyss or ocean of dissemblance. . . . A concept is a set of inseparable variations that is produced or constructed on a plane of immanence insofar as the latter crosscuts the chaotic variability and gives it consistency (reality). A concept is therefore a chaoid state par excellence; it refers back to a chaos rendered consistent, become Thought, mental chaosmos. . . . In short, chaos has three daughters, depending on the plane that cuts through it: these are the Chaoids—art, science, and philosophy—as forms of thought or creation.
(208)
The brain is the junction—not the unity—of the three planes.


Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. What Is Philosophy? New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Print.