Notes for Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia

Key concepts: abstract machine, anomalous, assemblage, code, Dividual, ethology, exteriority, functionalist conception, haecceity, Hypersphere, imperceptible, intension, involution, line of flight, Mechanosphere, milieu, nomad thought, One-Crowd, order-word, overload, pack mode, pass-word, plane of consistency, probe-head, punctual system, rhizome, signifiance, stratification, stratum, subjectification, symbiosis, tensor.


Related theorists: Artaud, Bergson, David Berry, John Cage, Pierre Clastres, Carlos Castaneda, Derrida, Floridi, Foucault, Freud, Hjelmslev, Husserl, Janz, Kleist, Latour, Nietzsche, Simondon, Spinoza, Jonathan Sterne, Tanaka-Ishii, Turkle, Paul Virilio.


1. Introduction: Rhizome

Where other chapters begin with a photograph, bizarre musical scribbled mess putatively titled XIV piano piece for David Tudor by SYLVANO BUSSOTI.

(3) Here we have made us of everything that came within range, what was closest as well as farthest away.

First mark over ten years ago.

Add becoming floss to types of media of postliteracy following conception of books of literacy; flossification evident through Bogost alien phenomenology tool, also typing preference for broad range of instances like Landow dynamic multidestination links.

(3-4) A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. . . . All this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes an assemblage. . . . What is the body without organs of a book? . . . We will never ask what a book means, as signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in with what bodies without organs it makes its own converge. A book is a little machine; what is the relation (also measurable) of this literary machine to a war machine, love machine, revolutionary machine, etc.--and an abstract machine that sweeps them along?
(4-5) All we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types, bodies without organs and their construction and selection, the plane of consistency, and in each case the units of measure. . . . Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come.
(5) A first type of book is the root-book.


2. 1914: One or Several Wolves?

Photography of wolf line previews schizoanalytic critique of Freud and refreshes familiar terms from Anti-Oedipus: contra Derrida, suggest Freud would have found a rhizome had he had modern internetworked stored program computing machinery to examine, just as the Galloway and Harper imply narratives in Thousand Plateaus describe protocological period phenomena, such as TCP/IP, APIs, object ontologies, database schema, and so on.

(27) No sooner does Freud discover the greatest art of the unconscious, this art of molecular multiplicities, than we find him tirelessly at work bringing back molar unities, reverting to his familiar themes of the father, the penis, the vagina, Castration with a capital C . . . (On the verge of discovering a rhizome, Freud always returns to mere roots.)


3. 10,000 B.C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It Is?)

Lobster photograph captioned Double Articulation: grasping fantasy concepts like body without organs, plane of consistency, and so on are actualized in contemporary global and local network machine cognition and represented by the lobster double articulation.

(40) In effect, the body without organs is itself the plane of consistency, which becomes compact or thickens at the level of the strata.

Mentions Hjelmslev who is important to Tanaka-Ishii initially in the context of the silly Challenger narrative, a version of the Platonic dialogue virtual reality phenomena representation.

(43) Challenger took offense, preferring to cite his friend, as he called him, the Danish Spinozist geologist, Hjelmselv, that dark prince descended from Hamlet who also made language his concern, precisely in order to analyze its “stratification.”

Could this first and second articulation be related to every media contains other media?

(44) Every stratum is a judgment of God; not only do plants and animals, orchids and wasps, sing or express themselves, but so do rocks and even rivers, every stratified thing on earth. The first articulation concerns content, the second expression.

Ecumenon and Planomenon fill a grid with stratum and plane of consistency; the single abstract machine can also be the machine other of human computer symbiosis peopled by post postmodern network dividuals.

(49-50) In short, both exterior and interior are interior to the stratum. . . . There is a single abstract machine that is enveloped by the stratum and constitutes its unity. This is the Ecumenon, as opposed to the Planomenon of the plane of consistency.

Line of flight describes means for animal to regain its associated milieu when danger appears.

(55) Since the associated milieu always confronts a milieu of exeteriority with which the animal is engaged and in which it takes necessary risks, a line of flight must be preserved to enable the animal to regain its associated milieu when danger appears (for example, the bull's line of flight in the arena, which it uses to regain the turf it has chosen). A second kind of line of flight arises when the associated milieu is rocked by blows from the exterior, forcing the animal to abandon it and strike up an association with new portions of exteriority, this time leaning on its interior milieus like fragile crutches.

Mechanosphere as set of all abstract machines and machinic assemblages.

Recognize mechanosphere becomes cyberspace, network, putatively positive about studying it by evidence of having written the book itself, all the while recognizing theory must transcend the strata formed by popular philosophies and theorists, turning to Applen and McDaniel, Landow, even Maner: what is here fantasized by a single abstract Ecumenon machine can also be the machine other of human computer symbiosis peopled by post postmodern network dividuals whose materiality as working code, running processes is the real of machine worlds (Brooks, Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Rosenberg).

(71) What we call the mechanosphere is the set of all abstract machines and machinic assemblages outside the strata, on the strata, or between strata.

Order-word unit computation conception of language emphasizes compulsion, obedience rather than information, shunting Floridi.

(75-76) The compulsory education machine does not communicate information; it imposes upon the child semiotic coordinates possessing all of the dual foundations of grammar (masculine-feminine, singular-plural, noun-verb, subject of the statement-subject of enunciation, etc.). The elementary unit of language—the statement—is the order-word. Rather than common sense, a faculty for the centralization of information, we must define an abominable faculty consisting in emitting, receiving, and transmitting order-words. Language is made not to be believed but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience. . . . Information is only the strict minimum necessary for the emission, transmission, and observation of orders as commands.

II. “There Is an Abstract Machine of Language That Does Not Appeal to Any 'Extrinsic' Factor”

Symbiosis, phylum amalgamations at level of technology invites consideration by symbioses of themselves, since they are human products; it is necessary to extend analysis beyond focusing on the tool to its overall milieu, exemplified by David Sterne.

(90) Even technology makes the mistake of considering tools in isolation: tools exist only in relation to the interminglings they make possible or that make them possible. The stirrup entails a new man-horse symbiosis that at the same time entails new weapons and new instruments. Tools are inseparable from symbioses or amalgamations defining a Nature-Society machinic assemblage. They presupposes a social machine that selects them and takes them into its “phylum”: a society is defined by its amalgamations, not by its tools.

III. “There Are Constants or Universals of Language That Enable Us to Define It as a Homogeneous System”

Does synthesizer, that is, programmed machine computations by technological devices supersede human equivalent as philosophical production?

(95) The synthesizer has taken the place of the old “a priori synthetic judgment,” and all functions change accordingly.

Tensor connects Gee and Bogost on value of risky edge behavior in games like Tetris as phenomenological description.

(99) The atypical expression constitutes a cutting edge of deterritorialization of language, it plays the role of tensor; in other words, it causes language to tend toward the limit of its elements, forms, or notions, toward a near side or a beyond of language.

VI. “Language Can Be Scientifically Studied Only under the Conditions of a Standard or Major Language”
(101) There is
no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language that at times advances along a broad front, and at times swoops down on diverse centers simultaneously.

Discussion of rhizome overload another post postmodern concept better exemplified in programming work than literary or oral forms.

(104) And the overload is not a rhetorical figure, a metaphor, or symbolic structure; it is a mobile paraphrase bearing witness to the unlocalized presence of an indirect discourse at the heart of every statement. From both sides we see a rejection of reference points, a dissolution of constant form in favor of differences in dynamic. The closer a language gets to this state, the closer it comes not only to a system of musical notation, but also to music itself.

Passwords represent manifestations of protocological substructure of cybernetic language, order-words the facts imposed as such in their instantaneous state value; is this a distinction between living writing working code and mere data or information?

(109-110) The multiplicity of systems of intensities conjugates or forms a rhizome throughout the entire assemblage the moment the assemblage is swept up by these vectors of tensions of flight. . . . There are pass-words beneath order-words. Words that pass, words that are components of passage, whereas order-words mark stoppages or organized, stratified compositions.


5. 587 B.C. - A.D. 70: On Several Regimes of Signs

Reproduction of artwork titled The Order of the Ark of the Israelites with caption A New Regime: multiplicity of circles or chains Hopi jumping spirals compares well to protocological network phenomena studied from framework of synchronic processes in many orders of magnitude layer model, here different speeds of situationally relative deterritorialization; see postsignifying regime that announces more distinctions, and other authors who articulate spirals.

(113-114) But what counts is less this circularity of signs than the multiplicities of the circles or chains. . . . The Hopi jump from one circle to another, or from one sign to another on a different spiral. . . . There is a distinction between circles because, although all signs refer to each other only to the extent that they are deterritorialized, oriented toward the same center of signifiance, distributed throughout an amorphous continuum, they have different speeds of deterritorialization attesting to a place of origin (temple, palace, house, street, village, bush, etc.), and they have differential relations maintaining the distinction between circles or constituting thresholds in the atmosphere of the continuum (private and public, family incident and social disorder). Moreover, the distribution of those thresholds and circles changes according to the case.

Subterranean becomings beyond faciality, such as postsignifying regime of signs, key to Berry.

(115) Conversely, when the face is effaced, when the faciality traits disappear, we can be sure that we have entered another regime, other zones infinitely muter and more imperceptible where subterranean becomings-animal occur, becomings-molecular, nocturnal deterritorializations overspilling the limits of the signifying system.

Postsignifying regime picked up by Berry, Galloway and other periodization frameworks as appropriate for electronic computing era, superseding disciplinary societies, although its keystone procedure of subjectification seems the the same dominant form of literary regimes.

(119) We would like to go into greater detail on a fourth regime of signs, the postsignifying regime, which has different characteristics opposing it to signifiance and is defined by a unique procedure, that of “subjectification.”

Perhaps sequence of finite proceedings closer to protocol operation than cruder depiction of spiraling circle jumping.

(120) In short, it operates by the linear and temporal succession of finite proceedings, rather than by the simultaneity of circles in unlimited expansion.
(148) All methods for the transcendentalization of language, all methods for endowing language with universals, from Russell's logic to Chomsky's grammar, have fallen into the worst kind of abstraction, in the sense that they validate a level that is both too abstract and not abstract enough. Regimes of signs are not based on language, and language alone does not constitute an abstract machine, whether structural or generative. The opposite is the case. It is language that is based on regimes of signs, and regimes of signs on abstract machines, diagrammatic functions, and machinic assemblages that go beyond any system of semiology, linguistics, or logic.


6. November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?

Image of Dogon Egg: can BwO ethics be applied to tech concepts, thinking of layer models?

(161) Staying stratified—organized, signified, subjected—is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. Connect, conjugate, continue: a whole “diagram,” as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs.


7. Year Zero: Faciality

Image of painting of Christ addressing fishermen: if face prerequisite for subjectivity, foes protocological diagram have a face?

Situated nature of communication, discussion of a computer is discussed.

(167-168) Signifiance is never without a wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies. Subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies. Since all semiotics are mixed and strata come at least in twos, it should come as no surprise that a very special mechanism is situated at their intersection. Oddly enough, it is a face: the white wall/black hole system. . . . The form of the signifier in language, even its units, would remain indeterminate if the potential listener did not use the face of the speaker to guide his or her choices? . . . A child, woman, mother, man, father, boss, teacher, police officer, does not speak a general language but one whose signifying traits are indexed to specific faciality traits. . . . The face digs the hole that subjectification needs in order to break through; it constitutes the black hole of subjectivity as consciousness or passion, the camera, the third eye.

Sounds like a problem for computer science, how we are dominated by our machines, the things that stand out for us to do something with when we have no dominant vision in our imagination; or how we are dominated by our machines, the things that do not work when we have a dominant vision the cannot see around them but only with them working; far from the milieu for which such simulation remained fantasy, Chun worries it has come to pass as programmed visions.

So there are just commercials for schizoanalysis, venture no further in doing what is recommended than announcing its necessity.

Evidence of level ontology for conceiving that which flip flops between diachrony in synchrony, plural forms, and reverse order synchrony in diachrony, that points to computer science for pondering its philosophies.

(171-172) What we need to consider is not fundamentally organs without bodies, or the fragmented body; it is the body without organs, animated by various intensive movements that determine the nature and emplacement of the organs in question and make that body an organism, or even a system of strata of which the organism is only a part. . . . The question of the body is not one of part-objects but of differential speeds.

Theorems of Deterritorialization, or Machinic Propositions

Machinic propositions make much more sense describing software and technological integrations, for example consideration of late binding in OOP, or basic application of biunivocalization as data structure; point is that built environment, extended mind may become facialized, again this is much more obvious with electronic computing than print media.

(174-175) First theorem: One never deterritorializes alone; there are always at least two terms, hand-use object, mouth-breast, face-landscape. And each of the two terms reterritorializes on the other. . . . Second theorem: The fastest of two elements or movements of deterritorialization is not necessarily the most intense or most deterritorialized. Intensity of deterritorialization must not be confused with speed of movement of development. . . . Third theorem: It can even be concluded from this that the least deterritorialized reterritorializes on the most deterritorialized. . . . As a general rule, relative deterritorialization (transcoding) reterritorialize on a deterritorialization that is in certain respects absolute (overcoding). . . . Even a use-object may come to be facialized: you might say that a house, utensil, or object, an article of clothing, etc., is watching me, not because it resembles a face, but because it is taken up in the white wall/black hole process, because it connects to the abstract machine of facialization. . . . Fourth theorem: The abstract machine is therefore effectuated not only in the faces that produce it but also to varying degrees in body parts, clothes, and objects that it facializes following an order of reasons (rather than an organization of resemblances).
(176) Doubtless, there are profound movements of deterritorialization that shake up the coordinates of the body and outline particular assemblages of power; however, they connect the body not to faciality but to becomings-animal, in particular with the help of drugs.

Face as emergent from specific conditions, not universal human; computation of normalities.
(176-177) The face is not a universal. . . . The face is Christ. . . . Thus the face is by nature an entirely specific idea, which did not preclude its acquiring and exercising the most general aspects: the abstract machine of faciality, insofar as it is composed by a black hole/white wall system, functions in two ways, one of which concerns the units or elements, the other the choices. Under the first aspect, the black hole acts as a
central computer. Christ, the third eye that moves across the wall or the white screen serving as general surface of reference. . . . like four-eye machines made of elementary faces linked together two by two. . . . concrete individualized faces are produced and transformed on the basis of these units, these combinations of units—like the face of a rich child in which a military calling is already discernible, that West Point chin. You don't so much have a face as slide into one.

Compare to Foucault deviant logic, racism to operating systems, essentialist philosophies.

(177-178) At every moment, the machine rejects faces that do not conform, or seem suspicious. But only at a given level of choice. For it is necessary to produce successive divergence-types of deviance for everything between what is accepted on first choice and what is only tolerated on second, third choice, etc. . . . the computation of normalities. . . . European racism as the white man's claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an “other.” . . . The dividing line is not between inside and outside but rather is internal to simultaneous signifying chains and successive subjective choices.

Christ-face: Giotto to go with illustrative art used by Lacan, Foucault.

(178) On the brighter side, painting has exploited all the resources of the Christ-face. . . . In this respect, there is an exultation in the painting of the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, like an unbridled freedom. . . . The most prodigious strokes of madness appear on canvas under the auspices of the Catholic code.

Central computing hole.

(179-180) But the problem is that all of this biunivocalization and binarization (which is not just the result of an increase in calculating skills, as some say) assumes the deployment of a wall or screen, the installation of a central computing hole without which no message would be discernible and no choice could be implemented. The black hole/white wall system must already have gridded all of space and outlined its arborescences or dichotomies for those of signifier and subjectification even to be conceivable. . . . Thus not only must the abstract machine of faciality provide a protective screen and a computing black hole; in addition, the faces it produces draw all kinds of arborescences and dichotomies without which the signifying and subjective would not be able to make the arborescences and dichotomies function that fall within their purview in language. . . . The faciality machine is not an annex to the signifier and the subject; rather, it is subjacent (connexe) to them and is their condition of possibility.

Programming as subjectivity practice like linguistics, both apparently incompatible with child at play.

(180) More generally, linguistics can tolerate no polyvocality or rhizome traits: a child who runs around, plays, dances, and draws cannot concentrate attention on language and writing, and will never be a good subject.
(182) We are thus led to define
limit-faces, which are different from both the facial units and the degrees of facial divergence previously defined.
(188) Here, the program, the slogan, of schizoanalysis is: Find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight.

Defacialization frees probe-heads that dismantle strata.

(190) sometimes, to the extent that it performs a veritable “defacialization,” it frees something like probe-heads (tetes chercheuses, guidance devices) that dismantle the strata in their wake, break through the walls of signifiance, pour out the holes of subjectivity, fell trees in favor of veritable rhizomes, and steer the flows down lines of positive deterritorializtion or creative flight.
(191) Must we leave it at that, three states, and no more: primitive heads, Christ-face, and probe-heads?


8. 1874: Three Novellas, or “What Happened?”


9. 1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity

Four errors and dangers ultimately attributed to Nietzsche Zarathustra and Casteneda Don Juan are dangers discussed by Harper in explication of critical importance of free (as in libre) open source practice.

(215) Four errors concerning this molecular and supple segmentarity are to be avoided.
(227) According to Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Castaneda's Indian Don Juan, there are three or even four dangers: first, Fear, then Clarity, then Power, and finally the great Disgust, the longing to kill and to die, the Passion for abolition.


10. 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible . . .

Steps into alien phenomenology.

(233) Memories of a Moviegoer.

(233) Memories of a Naturalist.

Pharmakeus sorceror connects to Derrida, indirectly to Berry via subterranean reference.

(237) Memories of a Bergsonian. . . . “From 1730 to 1734, all we hear about are vampires.” Structuralism clearly does not account for these becomings, since it is designed precisely to deny or at least denigrate their existence: a correspondence of relations does not add up to a becoming. . . . Does it not seem that alongside the two models, sacrifice and series, totem institution and structure, there is still room for something else, something more secret, more subterranean: the sorcerorand becomins (expressed in tales instead of myths or rites)?

Becoming easier understood as machine execution than humans becoming animal; application of Turkle and Tanaka-Ishii turn to technology for instantiating post postmodern theories, here Bergsonian multiple orders of durations.

(238) What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes. . . . This is the principle according to which there is a reality specific to becoming (the Bergsonian idea of a coexistence of very different “durations,” superior or inferior to “ours,” all of them in communication).

Symbioses another idea more readily conceived in terms of supervisory control and intermingled network layer processes; involution instead of evolution or regression: no possible filiation is what Hayles means by nonconscious technological processes imbricated with human cognition.

(238-230) If evolution includes any veritable becomings, it is in the domain of symbioses that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with no possible filiation. . . . Becoming is involutionary, involution is creative. To regress is to move in the direction of something less differentiated.

Pack mode like Wittgenstein family resemblance and Latour litany?

(239) Memories of a Sorcerer, I. . . . What we are saying is that every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack. That it has pack modes, rather than characteristics, even if further distinctions within these modes are called for.
(240) We must distinguish three kinds of animals.
(241-242) Bands, human or animal, proliferate by contagion, epidemics, battlefields, and catastrophes. . . . The Universe does not function by filiation. All we are saying is that animals are packs, and that packs form, develop, and are transformed by contagion.

Connection between war machine and assemblages; teaser suggestion of writing machine and musical machine (Nietzsche).

(242-243) These multiplicities with heterogeneous terms, cofunctioning by contagion, enter certain assemblages; it is there that human beings effect their becomings-animal. But we should not confuse these dark assemblages, which stir what is deepest within us, with organizations such as the institution of the family and the State apparatus. . . . The hunting machine, the war machine, the crime machine entail all kinds of becomings-animal that are not articulated in myth, still less in totemism. Dumezil showed that becomings of this kind pertain essentially to the man of war, but only insofar as he is external to families and States, insofar as he upsets filiations and classifications. The war machine is always exterior to the State, even when the State uses it, appropriates it. . . . (and what is the relation of the writing machine and the musical machine to becomings-animal?)

(243-244) Memories of a Sorcerer, II. . . . The abnormal can be defined only in terms of characteristics, specific or generic; but the anomalous is a position or set of positions in relation to a multiplicity. Sorcerers therefore use the old adjective “anomalous” to situate the positions of the exceptional individual in the pack.
(245) If the anomalous is neither an individual nor a species, then what is it? It is a phenomenon, but a phenomenon of bordering. This is our hypothesis: a multiplicity is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, not by the characteristics that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and dimensions it encompasses in “
intension.”

Latour litany of cases of becoming-animal, cited pell-mell.

(247) Let us cite pell-mell, not as mixes to be made, but as different cases to be studied: becomings-animal in the war machine.
(248) Invert Faust's formula: So that is what it was, the form of the traveling scholar? A mere poodle.

Role of science fiction since traveling scholar is a mere poodle (Asimov mentioned in footnote, but add Dick and others Hayles invokes).

(248) Memories of a Sorcerer, III. . . . Science fiction has gone through a whole evolution taking it from animal, vegetable, and mineral becomings to becomings of bacteria, viruses, molecules, and things imperceptible.

Accept indeterminacy; become a rhizome of the hypersphere/mechanosphere.

(250-251) The error we must guard against is to believe that there is a kind of logical order to this string, these crossings or transformations. It is already going too far to postulate an order descending from the animal to the vegetable, then to molecules, to particles. Each multiplicity is symbiotic; its becoming ties together animals, plants, microorganisms, mad particles, a whole galaxy. . . . Not following a logical order, but following alogical consistencies or compatibilities. The reason is simple. It is because no one, not even God, can say in advance whether two borderlines will string together or form a fiber, whether a given multiplicity will or will not cross over into another given multiplicity, or even if given heterogeneous elements will enter symbiosis, will form a consistent, or cofunctioning, multiplicity susceptible to transformation. No one can say where the line of flight will pass: Will it let itself get bogged down and fall back to the Oedipal family animal, a mere poodle? Or will it succumb to another danger, for example, turning into a line of abolition, annihilation, self-destruction, Ahab, Ahab . . . ? . . . Schizoanalysis, or pragmatics, has no other meaning: Make a rhizome.
(251-252) Far from reducing the multiplicities' number of dimensions to two, the
plane of consistency cuts across them all, intersects them in order to bring into coexistence any number of multiplicities, with any number of dimensions. . . . Everything becomes imperceptible, everything is becoming-imperceptible on the plane of consistency, which is nevertheless precisely where the imperceptible is seen and heard. It is the Planomenon, or the Rhizosphere, the Criterium (and still other names, as the number of dimensions increases). At n dimensions, it is called the Hypersphere, the Mechanosphere. It is the abstract Figure, or rather, since it has no form itself, the abstract Machine of which each concrete assemblage is a multiplicity, a becoming, a segment, a vibration. And the abstract machine is the intersection of them all.

(252) Memories of a Theologian.

Haecceity between sustantial forms and determined subjects (Tanaka-Ishii).

(253) An accidental form therefore has a “latitude” constituted by a certain number of composable individuations. A degree, an intensity, is an individual, a Haecceity that enters into composition with other degrees, other intensities, to form another individual. . . . In short, between substantial forms and determined subjects, between the two, there is not only a whole operation of demonic local transports but a natural play of haecceities, degrees, intensities, events, and accidents that compose individuations totally different from those of the well-formed subjects that receive them.

(253-254) Memories of a Spinozist, I. Substantial or essential forms have been critiqued in many different ways. Spinoza's approach is radical: Arrive at elements that no longer have either form or function, that are abstract in this sense even though they are perfectly real. They are distinguished solely by movement and rest, slowness and speed. They are not atoms, in other words, finite elements still endowed with form. Nor are they indefinitely divisible. They are infinitely small, ultimate parts of an actual infinity, laid out on the same plane of consistency or composition. . . . There are thus smaller and larger infinities, not by virtue of their number, but by virtue of the composition of the relation into which their parts enter. . . . There is therefore a unity to the plane of nature, which applies equally to the inanimate and the animate, the artificial and the natural. . . . It is a fixed plane, upon which things are distinguished from one another only by speed and slowness. A plane of immanence or univocality opposed to analogy. . . . What we are talking about is not the unity of substance but the infinity of the modifications that are part of one another on this unique plane of life.

Maturana or someone Gallagher introduced foregrounded this lack of discrete borders, which can be expressed as alien phenomenology (Bogost).

(255) It is a question not of organization but of composition; not of development or differentiation but of movement and rest, speed and slowness. . . . A plane of consistency people by anonymous matter, by infinite bits of impalpable matter entering into varying connections.
(256) Children are Spinozists. When Little Hans talks about a “peepee-maker,” he is referring not to an organ or an organic function but basically to a material, in other words, to an aggregate whose elements vary according to its connections, its relations of movement and rest, the different individuated assemblages it enters. . . . Spinozism is the becoming-child of the philosopher.

Spinoza ethology degrees of power sounds like Socrates reverse engineering method.

(256-257) Memories of a Spinozist, II. There is another aspect to Spinoza. To every relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness grouping together an infinity of parts, there corresponds a degree of power. . . . In the same way that we avoided defining a body by its organs and functions, we will avoid defining it by Species or Genus characteristics; instead we will seek to count its affects. This kind of study is called ethology, and this is the sense in which Spinoza wrote a true Ethics.
(259) The least that can be said is that the psychoanalysts, even Jung, did not understand, or did not want to understand. They killed becoming-animal, in the adult as in the child. They saw nothing. They see the animal as a representative of drives, or a representation of the parents. They do not see the reality of a becoming-animal, that it is affect in itself, the drive in person, and represents nothing. There exist no other drives than the assemblages themselves.

(260) Memories of a Haecceity.

Generic thingness, haecceity as mode of individuation, is both the object of computing and its subject, in the sense that it is matter as content and PHI as code in the same way human thought occurs in embodied brains; it, computing, machine cognition, alien intelligence makes more sense in context of electronic computing, that is, C++ and English, than extreme narratives of other human activities (oral and visual culture, zoographia) like the plateaus of post postmodern language machines, awkwardly expressed in philosophical musing about characteristic of all languages, Cage music, Godard cinema, then molecular memories. Much easier to talk about machine constituents of thinking as cognitive embodied processes outside human bodies than hundreds year old literature. So we are thinking about the next century discourse network 2000 as following orality and literacy; a better term is sought, for electracy privileges Derrida over electronics. Examples of this discipline include database trigger, late binding.

(261) There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substnce. We reserve the name haecceity for it.

The Matrix human real virtuality to machines is as imperceptible and meaningless as ones and zeros of machine experience is to humans, although both can express programmatic forms encoding sound like A+B+C.

(263) Spatiotemporal relations, determinations, are not predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities. . . . The plane of consistency contains only haecceities, along intersecting lines. Forms and subjects are not of that world. . . . It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome.
(263-264)
Indefinite article + proper name + infinitive verb constitutes the basic chain of expression, correlative to the least formalized contents, from the standpoint of a semiotic that has freed itself from both formal signifiances and personal subjectifications. . . . It is the military men and meteorologists who hold the secret of proper names, when they give them to a strategic operation or a hurricane. The proper name is not the subject of a tense but the agent of an infinitive.
(264) Even linguistics is not immune from the same prejudice, inasmuch as it is inseparable from a personology; according to linguistics, in addition to the indefinite article and the pronoun, the third-person pronoun also lacks the determination of subjectivity that is proper to the first two persons and is supposedly the necessary condition for all enunciation.
(265-266) We believe on the contrary that the third person indefinite, HE, THEY, implies no indetermination form this point of view; it ties the statement to a collective assemblage, as its necessary condition, rather than to a subject of the enunciation.

(265) Memories of a Plan(e) Maker.
(267) It is undoubtedly
John Cage who first and most perfectly deployed this fixed sound plane, which affirms a process against all structure and genesis, a floating time against pulsed time or tempo, experimentation against any kind of interpretation, and in which silence as sonorous rest also marks the absolute state of movement. The same could be said of the fixed visual plane: Godard, for example, effectively carries the fixed plane of cinema to this state where forms dissolve, and all that subsists are tiny variations of speed between movements in composition.
(268) Let us consider three major cases from nineteenth century German literature, H
ölderlin, Kleist, and Nietzsche.
(269) It seems to us the fragmentary writing is not so much the issue in Nietzsche. It is instead speeds and slownesses: not writing slowly or rapidly, but rather writing, and everything else besides, as a production of speeds and slownesses between particles.
(269-270) The plane of organization or development effectively covers what we have called
stratification: Forms and subjects, organs and functions, are “strata” or relations between strata. The plane of consistency or immanence, on the other hand, implies a destratification of all of Nature, by even the most artificial of means. The plane of consistency is the body without organs.
(272)
Memories of a Molecule.

Imagination required to become something like dog another difficult human trick presumed trivial in computing, representation and evaluation.

(274) An example: Do not imitate a dog, but make you organism enter into composition with something else in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proximity, into which they enter.

Does becoming-imperceptible amount to intuiting machine cognition, things happening in humanly incomprehensible temporal orders of magnitude and humanly impossible to digitally enumerate quantities, following logic that first radicalization is becoming the other sex, as that which most popularly distinguishes humans, then animals, then single atoms, down to smallest particle is where the crossovers between human and machine cognition occurs?
(279) If becoming-woman is the first quantum, or molecular segment, with the becomings-animal that link up with it coming next, what are they all rushing toward? Without a doubt, toward becomings-imperceptible. The
imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula.
(282) What allows us to describe an overall Drug assemblage in spite of the differences between drugs is a line of perceptive causality that makes it so that (1) the imperceptible is perceived; (2) perception is molecular; (3) desire directly invests the perception and the perceived. The Americans of the beat generation had already embarked on this path, and spoke of a molecular revolution specific to drugs. Then came Castaneda's broad synthesis.

Machinic reasons straddling the right horse instantiated in computing environment selection, such as floss, although for years it was driven by necessity (people needed usable computers) and marketing (obligatory late capitalism).
(286) We shall see that machinic reasons are entirely different from logical reasons or possibilities. One does not conform to a model, one straddles the right horse.

(286) Memories of the Secret.

(291) Memories and Becomings, Points and Blocks. Why are there so many becomings of man, but no becomings-man? First because man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are minoritarian; all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian.
(294-295)
A system is termed punctual when its lines are taken as coordinates in this way, or as localizable connections; for example, systems of arborescence, or molar and mnemonic systems in general, are punctual. Memory has a punctual organization because every present refers simultaneously to the horizontal line of the flow of time (kinematics), which goes from an old present to the actual present, and the vertical line of the order of time (stratigraphy), which goes from the present to the past, or to the representation of the old present.

Add programming to examples of lines of flight with music and painting (Harper).

(298) Lines of flight as perspective lines, far from being made to represent depth, themselves invent the possibility of such a representation which occupies them only for an instant, at a given moment. . . . Is painting, in each of its acts of creation, engaged in a becoming as intense as that of music?

(299) Becoming-Music. . . . Why a child, a woman, a bird? It is because musical expression is inseparable from a becoming-woman, a becoming-child, a becoming-animal that constitute its content.
(299) We would say that the
refrain is properly musical content, a block of content proper to music. A child comforts itself in the dark or claps its hands or invents a way of walking, adapting it to the cracks in the sidewalk, or chants “Fort-Da” (psychoanalysts deal with the Fort-Da very poorly when they treat it as a phonological opposition or a symbolic component of the language-unconscious, when it is in fact a refrain).

Machine counterparts to creative deterritorialization of music, and territorializing refrain?

(300) Music submits the refrain to this very special treatment of the diagonal or transversal, it uproots the refrain from its territoriality. Music is creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain. Whereas the refrain is essentially territorial, territorializing, or reterritorializing, music makes it a deterritorialized content for a deterritorializating form of expression.
(301) The “problem” within which painting is inscribed is that of the
face-landscape. That of music is entirely different: it is the problem of the refrain.

Physical and scientific accounts of music and visual arts like trying to explain network phenomena in electrical terms versus protocols.

(302-303) Music is a deterritorialization of the voice, which becomes less and less tied to language, just as painting is a deterritorialization of the face. . . . It is always possible to explain this force by the material conditions of musical emission and reception, but it is preferable to take the reverse approach; these conditions are explained by the force of deterritorialization of music. It could be said that from the standpoint of the mutant abstract machine painting and music do not correspond to the same thresholds, or that the pictorial machine and the musical machine do not have the same index.
(304) In short, the deterritorialization is double: the voice is deterritorialized in a becoming-child, but the child it becomes is itself deterritorialized, unengendered, becoming.
(305) One does not imitate; one constitutes a block of becoming. Imitation enters in only as an adjustment of the block, like a finishing touch, a wink, a signature.

Functionalist conception situated contextually to specific assemblages, in contrast to pure qualities of punctual systems.

(306) We are not at all arguing for an aesthetics of qualities, as if the pure quality (color, sound, etc.) held the secret of a becoming without measure, as in Philebus. Pure qualities still seem to us to be punctual systems. They are reminiscences, they are either transcendent or floating memories of seeds of phantasy. A functionalist conception, on the other hand, only considers the function a quality fulfills in a specific assemblage, or in passing from one assemblage to another.
(307) To the theorems of simple deterritorialization we encountered earlier (in our discussion of the face), we can now add others on generalized double deterritorialization.

Music resembles insects rather than birds, Wagnerian music deals in elementary units of becoming-molecular in which voice is instrumentalized, as in media convergence of generic sound synthesis, approaching becoming-imperceptible.

(308) This brings us to the second point: the principal problem concerning this new threshold of deterritorialization of the voice is no longer that of a properly vocal becoming-woman or becoming-child, but that of a becoming-molecular in which the voice itself is instrumentalized. . . . Already Wagner was reproached for the “elementary” character of his music, for its aquaticism, or its “atomization” of the motif, “a subdivision into infinitely small units.” . . . Birds are vocal, but insects are instrumental: drums and violins, guitars and cymbals. A becoming-insect has replaced becoming-bird, or forms a block with it.


11. 1837: Of the Refrain

Reproduction of Paul Klee Twittering Machine as introductory image/diagram gets new significance in age of Twitter; nature resembles protocol.

(316-317) The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark. Property, collective or individual, is derived from that, even when it is in the service of war and oppression. . . . The refrain is rhythm and melody that have been territorialized because they have become expressive—and have become expressive because they are territorializing. We are not going in circles. What we wish to say is that there is a self-movement of expressive qualities.

Code, transcoding, decoding.

(322) The essential thing is the disjunction noticeable between the code and the territory. The territory arises in a free margin of the code, one that is not indeterminate but rather is determined differently. Each milieu has its own code, and there is perpetual transcoding between milieus; the territory, on the other hand, seems to form at the level of a certain decoding. . . . It is because there is a disjunction between the territory and the code that the territory can indirectly induce new species. Wherever territoriality appears, it establishes an intraspecific critical distance between members of the same species; it is by virtue of its own disjunction in relation to specific differences that it becomes an oblique, indirect means of differentiation.

Rhizomatic functioning; cable network as distributed control; digital versus digitizing (Janz).

(328-329) It seems more important to us to underline a certain number of factors liable to suggest an entirely different schema, one favoring rhizomatic, rather than aborified, functioning, and no longer operating by these dualisms. First of all, what is called functional center brings into play not only a localization but also a distribution of an entire population of neurons selected from throughout the central nervous system, as in a “cable network.” . . . Consolidation is not content to come after; it is creative. The fact is that the beginning always begins in-between, intermezzo. . . . It is no longer a question of imposing a form upon a matter but of elaborating an increasingly rich and consistent material, the better to tap increasingly intense forces. . . . The territorial assemblage is a milieu consolidation, a space-time consolidation, of coexistence and succession. And the refrain operates with these three factors.

Machinic enunciation.

(330-331) A color will “answer” to a sound. If a quality has motifs and counterpoints, if there are rhythmic characters and melodic landscapes in a given order, then there is the constitution of a veritable machinic opera tying together orders, species, and heterogeneous qualities. What we term machinic is precisely this synthesis of heterogeneities as such. Inasmuch as these heterogeneities are matters of expression, we say that their synthesis itself, their consistency or capture, forms a properly machinic “statement” or “enunciation.”

Layer model of framing; forms are strata.

(335) These are different ways of stating the same distinction, which seems much broader than the one we are looking for: it is, in effect, a distinction between matter and life, or rather, since there is only one matter, between two states, two tendencies of atomic matter (for example, there are bonds that immobilize the linked atoms in relation to one another, and other bonds that allow free rotation). Stating the distinction in the most general way, we could say that it is between stratified systems or systems of stratification on the one hand, and consistent, self-consistent aggregates on the other. But the point is that consistency, far from being restricted to complex life forms, fully pertains even to the most elementary atoms and particles. There is a coded system of stratification whenever, horizontally, there are linear causalities between elements; and, vertically, hierarchies of order between groupings; and, holding it all together in depth, a succession of framing forms, each of which informs a substance an in turn serves as a substance for another form.

Do life and surplus value apply to technical concretization, a flip side of protocol?

(335-336) Now if we ask ourselves where life fits into this distinction, we see that it undoubtedly implies a gain in consistency, in other words, a surplus value (surplus value of destratification). . . . In effect, what holds an assemblage together is not the play of framing forms or linear causalities, but, actually or potentially, its most deterritorialized component, a cutting edge of deterritorialization.

One-Crowd and Dividual.

(341) Orchestration-instrumentation brings sound forces together or separates them, gathers or disperses them; but it changes, and the role of the voice changes too, depending on whether the forces are of the Earth or of the People, of the One-All or the One-Crowd. In the first case, it is a question of effecting groupings of powers, and these are what constitute affects; in the second case, it is group individuations that constitute affect and are the object of orchestration. Groupings of power are fully diversified, but they are like the relations proper to the Universal; we must use another word, the Dividual, to designate the type of musical relations and the intra- or intergroup passages occurring in group individuation. . . . The concepts of the One-Crowd and the Dividual are botched if the people is reduced to a juxtaposition, or if it is reduced to a power of the universal.

Philosophy as thought synthesizer; loop in formant synthesis and other forms of real virtuality production.

(343) Philosophy is no longer synthetic judgment; it is like a thought synthesizer functioning to make thought travel, make it mobile, make it a force of the Cosmos (in the same way as one makes sound travel).


12. 1227: Treatise on Nomadology—The War Machine

Drawing of nomad chariot.

(351) AXIOM I. The war machine is exterior to the State apparatus.
PROPOSITION I. This exteriority is first attested to in mythology, epic, drama, and games.

An unexpected, refreshing conception of game theories comparing chess and Go to illustrate striated and smooth, polis and nomos; compare to types of cybernetics presented by Hayles.

(352-353) Let us take a limited example and compare the war machine and the State apparatus in the context of the theory of games. Let us take chess and Go, from the standpoint of the game pieces, the relations between the pieces and the space involved. Chess is a game of State, or of the court: the emperor of China played it. Chess pieces are coded; they have an internal nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and confrontations derive. . . . Go pieces, in contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only an anonymous, collective, or third-person function: “It” makes a move. “It” could be a man, a woman, a louse, an elephant. Go pieces are elements of a nonsubjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic properties, only situational ones. . . . But what is proper to Go is war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy, whereas chess is a semiology. . . . The “smooth” space of Go, as against the “striated” space of chess. The nomos of Go against the State of chess, nomos against polis.

(356-357) PROBLEM I. Is there a way of warding off the formation of a State apparatus (or its equivalents in a group)?
PROPOSITION II. The exteriority of the war machine is also attested to by ethnology (a tribute to the memory of Pierre Clastres).

PROPOSITION III. The exteriority of the war machine is also attested to by epistemology, which intimates the existence and perpetuation of a “nomad” or “minor science.”
(361) According to a recent book by Michel Serres, both the atomic physics of Democritus and Lucretius and the geometry of Archimedes are marked by it [eccentric science; Husserl anexact yet rigorous].

Ambivalence of military engineer between war machine and State.

(362) State science retains of nomad science only what it can appropriate; it turns the rest into a set of strictly limited formulas without any real scientific status, or else simply represses and bans it. It is as if the “savants” of nomad science were caught between a rock and a hard place, between the war machine that nourishes and inspires them and the State that imposes upon them an order of reasons. The figure of the engineer (in particular the military engineer), with all its ambivalence, is illustrative of this situation.
Husserl protogeometry anexact yet rigorous science.

(367) Husserl speaks of a protogeometry that addresses vague, in other words, vagabond or nomadic, morphological essences. These essences are distinct from sensible things, as well as from ideal, royal, or imperial essences. Protogeometry, the science of dealing with them, is itself vague, in the etymological sense of “vagabond”: it is neither inexact like sensible things nor exact like essences, but anexact yet rigorous (“essentially and not accidentally inexact”).

(374) PROBLEM II. Is there a way to extricate thought from the State model?
PROPOSITION IV. The exteriority of the war machine is attested to finally by noology.
(374-375) Thought as such is already in conformity with a model that it borrows from the State apparatus, and which defines for it goals and paths, conduits, channels, organs, an entire
organon. There is thus an image of thought covering all of thought; it is the special object of “noology” and is like the State-form developed in thought. This image has two heads, corresponding to the two poles of sovereignty: the imperium of true thinking operating by magical capture, seizure or binding, constituting the efficacy of a foundation (mythos); a republic of free spirits proceeding by pact or contract, constituting a legislative and juridical organization, carrying the sanction of a ground (logos).

Pathetic, haecceity, event-thought versus subject-thought; nomad thought that does things differently.

(377-378) We have in mind in particular two pathetic texts, in the sense that in them thought is truly a pathos (an antilogos and an antimythos). One is a text by Artaud, in his letters to Jacques Riviere, explaining that thought operates on the basis of a central breakdown, that it lives solely by its own incpacity to take on form. . . . The other is the text by Kleist, “On the Gradual Formation of Ideas in Speech”, in which Kleist denounces the central interiority of the concept as a means of control—the control of speech, of language, but also of affects, circumstances, even chance. . . . A thought grappling with exterior forces instead of being gathered up in an interior form, operating by relays instead of forming an image; an event-thought, a haecceity, instead of a subject-thought, a problem-thought instead of an essence-thought or theorem; a thought that appeals to a people instead of taking itself for a government ministry. Is it by chance that whenever a “thinker” shoots an arrow, there is a man of the State, a shadow or an image of a man of the State, that counsels and admonishes him, and wants to assign him a target or “aim”?
(379) It is now easy for us to characterize the
nomad thought rejects this image and does things differently. It does not ally itself with a universal thinking subject but, on the contrary, with a singular race; and it does not ground itself in an all-encompassing totality but is on the contrary deployed in a horizonless milieu that is a smooth space, steppe, desert, or sea. An entirely different type of adequation is established here, between the race defined as “tribe” and smooth space defined as “milieu.”

(380) AXIOM II. The war machine is the invention of the nomads (insofar as it is exterior to the State apparatus and distinct from the military institution). As such, the war machine has three aspects, a spatiogeographic aspect, an arithmetic or algebraic aspect, and an affective aspect.
PROPOSITION V.
Nomad existence necessarily effectuates the conditions of the war machine in space.
(380) The nomad has a territory; he follows customary paths; he goes from one point to another; he is not ignorant of points (water points, dwelling points, assembly points, etc.). But the question is what in nomad life is a principle and what is only a consequence. To begin with, although the points determine paths, they are strictly subordinated to the paths they determine, the reverse of what happens with the sedentary.

(387) PROPOSITION VI. Nomad existence necessarily implies the numerical elements of a war machine.

Reality of articulated assemblies complicates Bogost units.

(391) A first characteristic of the numbering, nomadic or war, number is that it is always complex, that is, articulated. . . . The complex or articulated number comprises not only men but necessarily weapons, animals, and vehicles. . . . However small the unit, it is articulated.
(394) In short, military democracy and feudalism, far from explaining the numerical composition of the nomads, instead testify to what may survive of them in sedentary regimes.

(394) PROPOSITION VII. Nomad existence has for “affects” the weapons of a war machine.
Assemblage, use context over determinism.

(397-398) But the principle behind all technology is to demonstrate that a technical element remains abstract, entirely undetermined, as long as one does not relate it to an assemblage it presupposes. It is the machine that is primary in relation to the technical element: not the technical machine, itself a collection of elements, but the social or collective machine, the machinic assemblage that determines what is a technical element at a given moment, what is its usage, extension, comprehension, etc.

(403-404) PROBLEM III. How do the nomads invent or find their weapons?
PROPOSITION VIII. Metallurgy in itself constitutes a flow necessarily confluent with nomadism.
(404) The fact remains for weapons other than firearms, and even for the cannon, there is always a nomad on the horizon of a given
technological lineage.
(406) We will call an
assemblage every constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow—selected, organized, stratified—in such a way as to converge (consistency) artificially and naturally; an assemblage, in this sense, is a veritable invention.
(408) Certain distinctions proposed by
Simondon can be compared to those of Husserl. For Simondon exposes the technological insufficiency of the matter-form model, in that it assumes a fixed form and a matter deemed homogeneous.

(415-416) AXIOM III. The nomad war machine is the form of expression, of which itinerant metallurgy is the correlative form of content.
PROPOSITION IX. War does not necessarily have the battle as its object, and more important, the war machine does not necessarily have war as its object, although war and the battle may be its necessary result (under certain conditions).


13. 7000 B.C.: Apparatus of Capture

Animal and fence drawing.

(424) PROPOSITION X. The State and its poles.
(426) The State apparatus needs, at is summit as at its base, predisabled people, preexisting amputees, the stillborn, the congenitally infirm, the one-eyed and one-armed.
(427) We are always brought back to the idea of a State that comes into the world fully formed and rises up in a single stroke, the unconditioned
Urstaat.

(427) PROPOSITION XI. Which comes first?

(437) PROPOSITION XII. Capture.

(448) PROPOSITION XIII. The State and its forms.

(448) PROPOSITION XIV. Axiomatics and the presentday situation.

Adding and subtracting axioms sounds like style of mastery programing enjoys.

(461-462) 1. Addition, subtraction. . . . There is a tendency within capitalism continually to add more axioms. . . . the question is not that of freedom and constraint, nor of centralism and decentralization, but of the manner in which one masters the flows. In this case, they are mastered by the multiplication of directing axioms. The opposite tendency is no less a part of capitalism: the tendency to withdraw, subtract axioms. . . . The totalitarian State is not a maximum State but rather, following Virilio's formulation, the minimum State of anarcho-capitalism (cf. Chile).

(463) 2. Saturation.

(464) 3. Models, isomorphy.

(466) 4. Power (puissance).

(468) 5. The included middle.

(469) 6. Minorities.

(471) 7. Undecidable propositions.

Latour hybrid; pirate radio as proto-floss?

(472-473) At the same time as capitalism is effectuated in the denumerable sets serving as its models, it necessarily constitutes nondenumerable sets that cut across and disrupt those models. . . . Every struggle is a function of all of these undecidable propositions and constructs revolutionary connections in opposition to the conjugations of the axiomatic.


14. 1440: The Smooth and the Striated

Photograph of quilt.

(474-475)



Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. Print.