Notes for Heidegger “The Question Concerning Technology”

Key concepts: aletheuein, assembly, bringing-forth, challenging, danger, destining, eidos, ekphanestaton, Enframing, essence, history, in another, in itself, instrumentum, saving, standing-reserve, techne. unconcealment.

Bringing-forth translates German for Greek. Contrast bringing-forth Four causes of any technology instrumentum. Enframing, the spirit of an age before the Internet, as consummation of book forms, Heim in Electric Writing provides uses of the very dangerous machines of our real environment supporting virtual realities. Differentiate bringing-forth in itself and in another, natural versus produced things, extending from Heidegger's anthropocentrism to machine generated phenomena as the being of modern technological objects. Challenging revealing in modern technology often though as capitalist exploitation, maximum yield at minimum expense expediting. Subjectivity defined. Unconcealment transcends technological simulacra. Plato's use of eidos no longer appreciated as bold step in intellectual evolution exculpating Heidegger's use of Gestell as mildly radical in comparison. Any assembly is simulcrum, concretized Enframing. Seems to be anticipating philosophical domains arising from operation of future assemblies, which is why Turkle notices aptness of postmodern ideas in discourse surrounding personal computers, and Misa historicizes from Leonardo to the Internet. Transforming into standing-reserve more than action of capitalism because it implies epistemological component for historiography and other sciences. Human coming to brink of taking itself as standing-reserve interpellating into task of contemplating destining of revealing becomes call of cybersage for Heim. Compare notion of being truly free as attending to destining to programming with four freedoms of GPL, instantiating freeing claim in midst of the danger. Compare saving as fetching to its function in computation is another fun exercise putatively mocking Western philosophy but really on same track of revealing destining like contemplating names of electronic devices. Technology forces rethinking essence. Respond to Socratic search for kernel of subjectivity through digital humanities research. Staring at the technological the blinking of Nietzsche's last man, the enjoyment of consumption taken at interface value. The oscillation in little things may be the duck rabbit power of Heidegger described by theorists in my chosen texts. Nostalgia for Greek techne reflected in celebration of bricoleur by philosophers of computing, McGann theory-as-poiesis. Need to keep in mind the shining form presented here as ekphanestaton is remediated as shimmering signifiers when cast in texts and technology and digital media studies. Democratizing power of free, open source technologies salvation of assemblies for multipurposive learning. Enframing slips away as entrapping. My interpretation of Heidegger releases philosophical grip. Heidegger could not fantasize Internet. Trace back through use of Heidegger in other texts to circumscribe fossification.

Related theorists: Aristotle, Baudrillard, Bogost, Goethe, Hayles, Heim, Heisenberg, McGann, McLuhan, Nietzsche, Plato.

Notes originated in mid August 1995.

Not controversial that thinking depends on language.

(3) The way is a way of thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary.

McLuhan on media.

(4) But we are delivered over to it [the essence of technology] in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.

Four causes of any technology instrumentum.

(5) Technology itself is a contrivance, or, in Latin, an instrumentum.
(7) The four causes are ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else.
(8) That which gives bounds, that which completes, in this sense is called in Greek telos, which is all too often translated as “aim” or “purpose,” and so misinterpreted.
(9) What, after all, does this owing and being responsible mean, thought as the Greeks thought it?

Responsibility as starting something on its way into arrival; think about teaching.

(9) The principal characteristic of being responsible is this starting something on its way into arrival.

Differentiate bringing-forth in itself and in another, natural versus produced things, extending from Heidegger anthropocentrism to machine generated phenomena as the being of modern technological objects.

(10-11) It is of utmost important that we think bringing-forth [hervorbringen] in its full scope and at the same time in the sense in which the Greeks thought it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, ποίησις. Φύσις also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, ποίησις. Φύσις is indeed ποίησις in the highest sense. For what presences by means of φύσις has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (ὲν ἑαυτ). In contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g., the silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another (ὲν ἄλλῳ), in the craftsman or artist.
(12) If we inquire, step by step, into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing. The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing.

From Nichomachean Ethics VI, 3 and 4; I need to modify my statement (reinsert the modern age qualifier).

(12) Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth [aletheia, veritas, Wahrheit].

Techne as mode of aletheuein, bringing-forth as revealing more important than manufacturing.

(13) Techne is a mode of aletheuein. It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another. . . . Thus what is decisive in techne does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne is a bringing-forth.
(14) It is said that modern technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science. . . . Of what essence is modern technology that it happens to think of putting exact science to use?
(14) And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.

Challenging revealing in modern technology often though as capitalist exploitation, maximum yield at minimum expense expediting.

(15) This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature is an expediting [Foerdern], and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense.
(16) Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end. Neither does it run off into the indeterminate. The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through regulating their course. This regulating itself is, for its part, everywhere secured. Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristic of the challenging revealing.

Famous definition of the standing-reserve.

(17) Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]. The word expresses here something more, and something more essential, than mere "stock." The name "standing-reserve" assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object.

early Greek thinking
-> turn [PREP] subject/object
both at once ,-
[Figure 970120.0359 The most dangerous formula]

Unconcealment transcends technological simulacra; subjectivity defined.

(18) But man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws.
(18) Yet precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere standing-reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, any more than is the realm through which man is already passing every time he as a subject relates to an object.

[Here he is describing nothing less than “the world”.]

(19) The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already come to pass whenever it calls man forth into the modes of revealing allotted to him. When man, in his way, from within unconcealment reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call of unconcealment even when he contradicts it. Thus when man,investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challanges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.

Enframing, the spirit of an age before the Internet, as consummation of book forms, Heim in Electric Writing provides uses of the very dangerous machines of our real environment supporting virtual realities.

(19) We now name that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve: "Ge-stell" [Enframing].

Plato use of eidos no longer appreciated as bold step in intellectual evolution exculpating Heidegger use of Gestell as mildly radical in comparison.

(20) We, late born, are no longer in a position to appreciate the significance of Plato's daring [audacia?] to use the word eidos for that which in everything and in each particular thing endures as present. . . . Compared with the other instances, the use of the word Gestell as the name for the essence of modern technology, which we now venture here, is almost harmless.

Any assembly is simulacrum, concretized Enframing; democratizing power of free, open source technologies salvation of assemblies for multipurposive learning.

(20-21) Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. . . . The assembly itself, however, together with the aforementioned stockparts, falls within the sphere of technological activity; and this activity always merely responds to the challenge of Enframing, but it never comprises Enframing itself or brings it about.

We are granted insight into that other great question Heidegger asked for us, what handicraft modern man in the technological world must carry on, must carry on even if he is not a worker in the sense of the worker at the machine. You see (continuing the thought upon the real introduction of musical phenomena, among others to real philosophical production, such as on The Philosophy Channel or pirate broadcast) that the way of representing, bound for so long to the Book Form, may crystallize physis into calculable coherences only or mostly because of the structural law of the representing techne, calculative apparatus may be imaginable, and viable, in dynamic, electrical-electronic environments, that we humans never view, and, for that reason, do not need to suffer the translation into those schemas of representation ideally exhibitable in a symbolic form.

(21) Modern science's way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces. Modern physics is not experimental physics because it applies apparatus to the questioning of nature. Rather the reverse is true. Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it therefore orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself when set up in this way.

Modern physics experiments assume Enframing ontological and epistemological truth facts.

(22) Modern physics is the herald of Enframing, a herald whose origin is still unknown.

Seems to be anticipating philosophical domains arising from operation of future assemblies, which is why Turkle notices aptness of postmodern ideas in discourse surrounding personal computers, and Misa historicizes from Leonardo to the Internet.

Is this a reactive stance?

(22) All coming to presence, not only modern technology, keeps itself everywhere concealed to the last. Nevertheless, it remains, with respect to its holding sway, that which precedes all: the earliest. . . . Therefore, in the realm of thinking, a painstaking effort to think through still more primally what was primally thought is not the absurd wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded before the coming of what is early.

[<961202.1052<(..)a question asked much earlier, obviously]
Reactive the way he thinks his preparation, shunning schizophrenia. Avoiding the Nietzschean project of musical philosophy—and were Heidegger alive today, publishing on the web, without devoting his most sober mental energies to computer programming—what then?
Devolution: Socrates began it, saying somewhere something about how much geometry you should know—and, I presume, learn—applied (transferred) to the latest “home” around which like a focus our cares and concerns gather (active) and (middle/passive) are gathered: to have only enough PHYSICS to—I don’t think “measure” is appropriate any more— (..) our computers. Wo es war, soll Ich werden, rationalizing fascization; Heidegger’s fantasy of Nietzsche’s project. Since DEAD(s&n&h) the burden of thought devolves to us (tautologous that also to the books).

(22) Chronlogically speaking, modern physical science begins in the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only in the second half of the eighteenth century. But modern technology, which for chronological reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view of the essence holding sway within it, the historically earlier.

Nice commentary on growing inscrutibility of representation in physics, the demand of the model of ratio, symbolic logic and its galaxies of meaning, subjects science to its tests: witness the loss of natural science (folk medicine, etc), including their cures and uses, to that which can be explained, perfectly in line with modern psychology.

(23) [Enframing demands] that nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of information.

Resignation in Heisenberg lecture like that of Baudrillard; see response to first exam question.

(23) It seems as though causality is shrinking into a reporting - a reporting challenged forth - of standing-reserves that must be guaranteed either simultaneously or in sequence. To this shrinking would correspond the process of growing resignation that Heisenberg's lecture depicts in so impressive a manner.

Transforming into standing-reserve more than action of capitalism because it implies epistemological component for historiography and other sciences.

How does this relate to my method of thinking, taking notes with chronological references and trying to make all these hypertext connections? Am I lost in the trap, or breaking through to the other side? “But it works so well” the little Dwarf insists, “I can think about anything I want, any time, anywhere.” And blinks.

(24) The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way of that revealing through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing-reserve. . . . It is from out of this destining [Geschick] that the essence of all history [Geschichte] is determined. . . . it is only the destining into objectifying representation that makes the historical accessible as an object for historiography, i.e., for a science, and on this basis makes possible the current equating of the historical with that which is chronicled.
(24-25) Enframing, as a challenging-forth into ordering, sends into a way of revealing. Enframing is an ordaining of destining, as is every way of revealing. Bringing-forth, poiesis, is also a destining in this sense.

Compare notion of being truly free as attending to destining to programming with four freedoms of GPL, instantiating freeing claim in midst of the danger; programming consumes philosophy via flossification. In the background hear Negativland clip exclaiming it is not a joke.

(25) Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man. But that destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and hears [Hoerender], and not one who is simply constrained to obey [Hoeriger].

Freedom of the open. We could subject that definition of freedom to our tensed modal logic, if we so desired. It makes a powerful statement concerning the problem of purity in thinking, of the sort Heidegger attributed to Socrates, who never wrote anything down. Also reverberating in this tank circuit the touching description of former at an age well beyond Socrates when he chose to die: to avoid building-up systems and concepts, to start anew everyday in that condition of attunement where your divine scenting is not confused by energy-wells of signification.

(25) All revealing comes out of the open, goes into the open, and brings into the open. The freedom of the open consists neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in the constraint of mere laws. Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil that covers what comes to presence of all truth and lets the veil appear as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts upon its way.

Freeing claim because the decision tree never unfolds biunivocally as we had wished it to, for there is always the option of continuing to fantasize, ideate, think in the draft, as an asymptotically perfect deviation from both hypothetical tracks of decision. Or do you reduce even that node to a bifurcation? Then the node itself must “know” and carry the thought. Yes. But precisely at this point of withheld decision (to begin following whatever path or plan) we are still imagining those possibilities. We might dream, for example, that we will follow Heidegger’s lead an study ancient Greek for the next ten years. Or that we will take a firm stance in the center of the danger and study computer science, electronic technology, and built that goddamn contraption that we keep thinking (or our voice provokes us to believe) will solve all of our STUPID problems, freeing us yet further for more.

(25-26) But when we consider the essence of technology, then we experience Enframing as a destining of revealing. In this way we are already sojourning within the open space of destining, a destining that in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same thing, to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of the devil. Quite on the contrary, when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim.
(26) Since destining at any give time starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possibility is blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing.

Danger as such in destining of revealing, the most dangerous undertaking a conscious subject can attempt; refer to discussion of tolma audacity in Introduction to Metaphysics.

(26) The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such.

Human coming to brink of taking itself as standing-reserve interpellating into task of contemplating destining of revealing becomes call of cybersage for Heim, always negotiating enframing of system operations for Bogost connection.

(26-27) As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself.
(27) But Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of ordering. Above all, Enframing conceals that revealing which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance.

Truth comes to pass in unconcealment veiled by representational thinking, precession of simulacra. And what happens when you have been banished into that kind of revealing which is an ordering? You can easily come to feel as if you have used up your allowance of experiences, run through all the possibilities, and merely persist in an occasionally-conscious metonymy. {n, n+1, n+2, n+3, .., 1, 1-n, 1-(n+1), 1-(n+2), ..}

(27) Thus the challenging Enframing not only conceals the former way or revealing, bringing-forth, but it conceals revealing itself and with it That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass.

Invocation of Holderlin without third line about poetic dwelling.

(28) The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.

But where danger is, grows
The saving power also.

Time to ponder essence in order to behold the saving power, compare saving as fetching to its function in computation is another fun exercise putatively mocking Western philosophy but really on same track of revealing destining like contemplating names of electronic devices.

(28) "To save" is to fetch something home into its essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time into its genuine appearing. . . . might not an adequate look into what Enframing is as a destining of revealing bring into appearance the saving power in its arising.

Enframing as way of revealing having character of destining is true essence of technology.

(29) The machines and apparatus are no more cases and kinds of Enframing than are the man at the switchboard and the engineer in the drafting room. Each of these in its own way indeed belongs as stockpart, available resource, or executor, within Enframing; Enframing is never the essence of technology in the sense of a genus. Enframing is a way of revealing having the character of destining.

Technology forces rethinking essence, two notions of Wesen (to essence): Hebel Weserei (constant play of coming-to presence) and Waehren (to last or endure), the traditional Platonic interpretation (aei on & eidos).

(30) Thus Enframing, as a destining of revealing, is indeed the essence of technology, but never in the sense of genus and essentia. If we pay heed to this, something astounding strikes us: It is technology itself that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usually understood by "essence."
(30-31) All essencing endures. But is enduring only permanent enduring? . . . The way in which technology essences lets itself be seen only from out of that permanent enduring in which Enframing comes to pass as a destining of revealing. Goethe once uses the mysterious word fortgewaehren [to grant permanently] in place of fortwaehren [to endure permanently]. He hears waehren [to endure] and gewaehren [to grant] here in one unarticulated accord..Only what is granted endures. That which endures primally out of the earliest beginning is what grants.

Seems like a statement endorsing extended mind of Clark, posthuman cyborg of Hayles.

(31) The challenging-forth into the ordering of the real as standing-reserve still remains a destining that starts man upon a way of revealing. As this destining, the coming to presence of technology gives man entry into That which, of himself, he can neither invent nor in any way make. For there is no such thing as a man who, solely of himself, is only man.

Respond to Socratic search for kernel of subjectivity through digital humanities research.

(32) For it is granting that first conveys to man that share in revealing which the coming-to-pass of revealing needs. . . . This dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment - and with it, from the first, the concealment - of all coming to presence on this earth. It is precisely in Enframing which threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed single way of revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of his free essence - it is precisely in this extreme danger that the innermost indestructible belongingness of man within granting may come to light, provided that we, for our part, begin to pay heed to the coming to presence of technology.
(32) Thus the coming to presence of technology harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving power.

Staring at the technological the blinking of Nietzsche last man, the enjoyment of consumption taken at interface value; so we are scenting dogs once again, this time keeping watch over the unconcealment, spectators, ideally, adding nothing new but rather struggling to return to that condition of fixing-to-reveal where freedom is. Is that a constant forgetting? I think I read something in Klossowski’s article on the ER that mirrors what would be the consequent experience of such a proposal.

(32) Everything, then, depends upon this: that we ponder this arising and that, recollecting, we watch over it. How can this happen? Above all through our catching sight of what comes to presence in technology, instead of merely staring at the technological.
(33) The essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth.
(33) On the one hand, Enframing challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically endangers the relation to the essence of truth.

Looks to likelihood of future spread of saving experience, in his epoch only little things here and there; if only we had kept teaching programming in public schools.

(33) On the other hand, Enframing comes to pass for its part in the granting that lets man endure - as yet unexperienced, but perhaps more experienced in the future - that he may be the one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth. Thus does the arising of the saving power appear.
(33) The irresistibility of ordering and the restraint of the saving power draw past each other like the paths of two stars in the course of the heavens. But precisely this, their passing by, is the hidden side of their nearness.
(33) When we look into the ambiguous essence of technology, we behold the constellation, the stellar course of the mystery.

The answer to what is the question: we are not saved, but are summoned to hope in the growing light of the saving power; must we minister to this growth like a peasant a garden?

(33) The question concerning technology is the question concerning the constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the coming to presence of truth, comes to pass.

The oscillation in little things may be the duck rabbit power of Heidegger described by theorists in my chosen texts.

(33) Here and now in little things, that we may foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding always before our eyes the extreme danger.
(33-34) Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human achievement can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it.
(34) There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name techne. Once that revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearing also was called techne.

Nostalgia for Greek techne reflected in celebration of bricoleur by philosophers of computing, McGann theory-as-poiesis.

(34) In Greece, at the outset of the destining of the West, the arts soared to the supreme height of the revealing granted them. They brought the presence [Gegenwart] of the gods, brought the dialogue of divine and human destinings, to radiance. And art was simply called techne. It was a single, manifold revealing. It was pious, promos, i.e., yielding to the holding-sway and the safekeeping of truth.
(34) Because it was a revealing that brought forth and hither, and therefore belonged within poiesis. It was finally that revealing which holds complete sway in all the fine arts, in poetry, and in everything poetical that obtained poiesis as its proper name.

Repetition of Holderlin on danger and saving power with third line about poetic dwelling.

(34) The same poet from who we heard the words

But where danger is, grows
The saving power also.

says to us:

poetically dwells man upon this earth.

Ekphanestaton appropriate to machine subjectivities running in virtual worlds in machines; we can still use Heidegger to get into machine embodiment and poetic dwelling, but its use in philosophy of computing is deprecated.

The shining form presented here as ekphanestaton is remediated as shimmering signifiers when cast in texts and technology and digital media studies. Can I use words from songs, if not the actual Dasein of the song (virtuality)—that is, not just a sound byte but presupposing full cognizance of the work, so that a fragment suffices to evoke the experience of enthusiastically witnessing the whole—as Heidegger employs poetry? Or should we indeed prohibit Heidegger’s practice just as the musicians were excluded from the famous drinking party, and all those arguments from Havelock? The realm of art may harbor the saving power, provided we do not let technological Enframing "come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth" completely (where art is merely aesthetics, for example)

(34) The poetical brings the true into the splendor of what Plato in the Phaedrus calls to ekphanestaton, that which shines forth most purely. The poetical thoroughly prevades every art, every revealing of coming to presence into the beautiful.

Questioning is piety of thought; although Heidegger could not fantasize Internet, we can trace back through use of Heidegger in other texts to circumscribe fossification. Need to read print book again after twenty years.

(35) The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought.

Heidegger, Martin. The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays. New York: Harper and Row, 1977. Print.