I. INTRODUCTION: A ROLE FOR HISTORY


The image we get from textbooks concerning scientific development has mostly been derived from the perspective of the scientists themselves, of finished acievements. "Inevitably, however, the aim of such books is persuasive and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist brochure."(1) We ought to look at a more historical approach, instead. Yet even historical approaches fail to escape the 'textbook superficiality' when the questions investigated are couched in the theories (and data-gathering techniques) presented in the books -- the picture generated is one in which science is "the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current texts," and scientists are piecemeal contributors.(1) Some modern historians are finding it very difficult to clarify the details under the "accumulation by individual discoveries and inventions" picture of science. More importantly, the distinction between myth and pseudo-science and the current practices is harder to perceive, especially if the theories of the past were considered just as scientific as ours do today: what will future generations say of the present science? This consideration raises serious doubts "about the cumulative process through which these individual contributions to science were thought to have been compounded."(3)

A revolution is occuring in the historiographic study of science; new questions are being asked, and different, less cumulative lines of development are being traced. "Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they attempt to display the historical integrity of that science in its own time."(3) For example, investigating Galileo's views in terms of the science of his time, and the thought and criticism of his contemporaries, rather than against current thinking. Results:

(1) How one does science (the "methodological directives") by itself does not yield the particular conclusions made in different periods. Effective (for the individual as well as the community) are such aspects as prior experience in other fields, idiosyncrasies of the investigations, and individual makeup.(4) Thus there is are many arbitrary elements besides methodology which play a role in the formation of the beliefs of a particular scientific community, at a particular time.

(2) On the other hand, every scientific community holds some basic beliefs, concerning basic entities, interaction among them, what we can ask about them, and how to go about doing it. Today most "mature" sciences have textbooks and institutionalized training, part of which is the inculcation of the specific answersto these questions for that group -- "research as a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education."(5)

(3) Normal science is carried out on the assumption that "the scientific community knows what the world is like."(5) But the novelty (arbitrariness) always remains, however much it is suppressed. Recurring anomalies that cannot be subsumed under the hypotheses of the community at large spark deeper, wider investigations, leading "the profession at last to a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science."(6) These "extraordinary episodes" are the scientific revolutions.

(4) There are many well-known revolutions (Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein), and Kuhn draws some general characteristics.

Each of them necessitated the community's rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it. Each produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as a transformation of the world within which scientific work is done.(6)

(5) We can find these characteristics in other episodes that were not as obviously revolutionary as those listed above. The point is that "a new theory, however special its range of applications, is seldom or never just an increment to what is already know. Its assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory and the re-evaluation of prior fact."(7) The discovery of new scientific facts (like oxygen and x-rays) can have as great an effect on the scientific community as new theories: the world-picture may need to be re-evalutated, as well as experimental procedures, corresponding theories, and the like. Many new discoveries foster revolutionary rethinking, rather than just representing another item of acculumated knowledge.

He goes on to list the problems covered beyond ch. IX, and admits the problems inherent in this sort of investigation. Many of his generalizations are sociological or psychological points about scientists and their communities, though others seem genuinely logical or epistemlogical. He sees the possible circularity of his investigation (9) but proposes to go on, since the enterprise is itself a scientific investigation and the content ought to be discovered "by observing them in application to the data they are meant to elucidate."(9)

II. THE ROUTE TO NORMAL SCIENCE

'Normal Science' is defined as "research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements...that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice."(10) Since the early nineteenth century, science textbooks contained the accepted theories and methodical directives; before that, the great classics (of Aristotle, Ptolemy, Newton, etc.) did this job. All such works possess two essential characteristics which Kuhn outlines: "Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity....[while] sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practicioners to resolve."(10) [Consider these points for our problem of what makes a theory 'scientific,' or 'good.' Would a system based on hexes and the like suceed on these two criteria?] Paradigms are those bodies of scientific achievement sharing these two features, and the basic preparation for any new professional amounts to becoming familiar with them.

Because he there joins men who learned the bases of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals....That commitment [to the same basic rules and procedures] and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition.(11)

Examples of paradigms include: Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian dynamics, and wave optics -- but of course there are plenty of specialized and highly dense fields as well. An important point Kuhn would like to prove is that the concrete achievement described in the paradigm is prior to the "concept, laws, theories, and points of view abstracted from it."(11)

Here is a (backwards) summary of the development on the science of light and optics. Today the textbooks tell students that light is photons, a model based on recent research in quantum mechanics. Before Planck, Einstein, and others who developed quantum theory, light was conceived of as "transverse wave motion, a conception rooted in a paradigm that derived ultimately from the optical writings of Young and Fresnel in the early nineteenth century."(12) Prior to that, Newton's Opticks pictured light as material corpuscles rather than as waves. Kuhn characterizes these transformations in the conception of the nature of physical optics as genuine scientific revolutions, and notes that "the successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science."(12) This is different, however, from the theories concerning the nature of light before Newton -- instead of one particular conception being generally held superior to all the others, before the seventeenth century, and stretching back into antiquity, many competing theories existed "in a number of competing schools and subschools, most of them espousing one variant or another of Epicurean, Aristotelian, or Platonic theory."(12) The results of these endeavors do not fit our notion of true 'science:' most of them had to build their field from the foundations upward, and hence their choice of data and methods of experimentation lacked a coherent standard, so that "the dialogue of the resulting books was often directed to the members of other schools as it was to nature."(13) This seems similar to the results of much creative effort today, and discoveries and inventions may spring out of it, but mature sciences present a different character.

He reviews the history of electrical research to better exemplify "the way a science develops before it acquires its first universally accepted paradigm,"(13) and wants us to believe that the histories of most other scientific systems follow this route (with the exception of branches reaching back into prehistory, and specialty fields like biochemistry, which arose out of mature parent systems). For the social sciences it is questionable whether any paradigms have been acquired.

Then there are the difficulties inherent in pre-paradigmatic theories: fact-gathering is pretty random, restricted to the ready-at-hand (no persuasive theoretical reasons to do non-standard detailed investigations), and produces a hodge-podge "morass" of information. "Only very occasionally, as in the cases of ancient statics, dynamics, and geometrical optics, do facts collected with so little guidance from pre-established theory speakwith sufficient clarity to permit the emergence of a first paradigm."(16) Another problem lies in the fact that in order to evaluate, categorize, and criticism, more than "mere facts" are necessary, and in the absence of the guidelines of a paradigm, the structural aspects of the science must come from external sources -- "perhaps by a current metaphysic, by another science, or by personal and historical accident."(17)

Why do the initial divergences disappear as a science matures? The triumph of a school and the establishment of the first paradigm (though, such as in the case of Franklin's theory of electrical attraction, it need not be able to answer all the questions). Then with a mitigation of the "interschool debate" scientists have time and desire to do more involved, time-consuming study; specialize, in a word, and design equipment and procedures for more systematic investigations. Kuhn calls this "highly directed or paradigm-based research."(18)

How does the emergence of a paradigm affect the scientists themselves? Much of the present generation converts, the die-hard holders of the old views are ignored, and the new generation is thus attracted to the new paradigm. Many new sciences become autonomous from the philosophy department, and for many, "the formation of specialized journals, the foundation of specialists' societies, and the claim for a special place in the curriculum" heralds "a group's first reception of a single paradigm."(19) [We can easily extend this notion to academic and professional disciplines in general!] The science becomes more rigidly defined, which has its own advantages for the individual: she no longer has to justify herself and start from the foundations every time she does something (that's what textbooks are for), and she can focus her creative energies where the texts break off, in the "subtlest and most esoteric aspects of the natural phenomena that concerns his group," and share findings and ideas with the specialized group rather than having to speak to the masses (and scientists in other disciplines.(20) He gives examples of when different disciplines "lost" the average reader, and sees a correlation with their flourishing as mature, paradigm-centered sciences. Thus he notes that "although it has become customary, and is surely proper, to deplore the widening gulf that separates the professional scientist from his collegues in other fields, too little attention is paid to the essential relationship between that gulf and the mechanisms intrinsic to scientific advance."(21) [The wrap-up of electricity's rise to maturity (21-22) is a good summation.]

III. THE NATURE OF NORMAL SCIENCE

First let's differentiate our notion of paradigm from the standard: not really a template for replication, but "like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions."(23) At its first appearance a new paradigm has a very limited scope, and is hardly precisely articulated. Remember, paradigms emerge because they work better at solving some problems which the specific scientific community has recognized as acute.(23) They begin with rough edges and need to be honed; as Kuhn puts it,

The success of a paradigm...is at the start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise, and actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm's predicitons, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself.(24)

Normal science procedes after this initial promise has been ratified, so to speak, by the community; Kuhn calls it "mop-up work," and proposes that the laity does not realize the extent to which normal science is just this sort of activity (nor do they see how exciting this work can be, he adds). He makes the empirical claim that the work here centers on"an attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies," rather than seeking to discover new phenomena or formulating new theories. "Mopping-up operations are what engage most scientists throughout their careers....normal scientific research is directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies."(24)

On the first pass this notion is hard to accept. Yet Kuhn asserts that it is only through the narrowing of focus and assumption-granting power of the paradigm that the careful, costly, detailed work that mature science comes about. Science is a social activity which cosumes time, money, and intellectual energy, and requires definition and justification in order to survive; decisions have to be made, and the paradigm offers the necessary guidelines. The foci of both factual and theoretical investigation are quite specific and limited in comparison to the world-inscribing, world-defining undertakings of pre-paradigmatic sciences. Kuhn sees "three normal foci for factual scientifc investigation, and they are neither always nor permanently distinct."(25)

(1) There are facts which, in the terms of the paradigm, tell us important things about the world. Thus they deserve to be better explicated, for they are crucial facets of problem-solving within the paradigm. These include stellar positions, magnitudes, periods for astronomy; specific gravities, wavelengths, boiling points, and the like for physics and chemistry. A good percentage of the experimental and observational literature in a subject is devoted to increasing the accuracy and scope of these facts, not to mention the endeavors made at improving the apparatus for this work.(25)

(2) Making up a much smaller class are factual determinations which represent a direct link between the paradigm theory and the world. These are usually nothing special in themselves, but rather function as a test for predictions -- and "there are seldom many areas in which a scientific theory, particularly if it is cast in a predominantly mathematical form, can be directly compared with nature."(26) Kuhn, in fact, notes only three instances of areas relevant to Einstein's theory of relativity, and for particle physics and other mature sciences, extraordinarly specialized and complicated appartatus is usually required to make the observations. Notice the direct dependence of this kind of factual research upon the paradigm: it not only "sets the problem to be solved; often the paradigm theory is implicated directly in the design of apparatus able to solve the problem."(27)1

(3) Finally there is empirical research which functions "to articulate the paradigm theory, resolving some of its residual ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only drawn attention."(27) This includes determining mathematical constants, like the universal gravitational constant and Avagadro's number. In addition there are the specific quantitative laws that accompany the general overall framework of the paradigm, and, like the above constants, they are hardly the sort of regularities discovered in the rough, Baconian method "found by examinin measurements undertaken for their own sake and without theoretical commitment."(28) A final class of experiments involve the exploration of the qualititive aspects of the paradigm's relation to nature, for "often a paradigm developed for one set of phenomena is ambiguous in its application to other closely related phenomena."(29) The example here deals with the phenomenon of heating by compressionThese sorts of laws and facts appear in every scientific textbook, yet it is often overlooked that they were bought at incredible expense. "Few of these elaborate efforts would have been conceived and none would have been carried out without a paradigm theory to define the problem and to guarantee the existence of a stable solution."(28)

Next are the efforts to elucidate theoretical considerations, all parasitic on the paradigm theory as well, in terms of their mere conceivability, as well as the justification for the effort and expense of their undertaking.

(1) Some theoretical work is devoted simply to making useful predictions while not really extending the scope or elucidation of the paradigm. Such theoretical applications include "[t]he manufacture of astrinomical ephemerides, the computation of lens characteristics, and the production of radio propagation curves." These fairly routine and standardized procedures, however, are generally regarded by scientists "as hack work to be relegated to engineers or technicians."(30)

(2) Other manipulations of the theory do find a place in mainstream research and are published in scientific journals, but not for practical purposes but rather "to display a new application of the paradigm or to increase the precision of an application that has already been made."(30) Developing points of contact between theory and nature is seldom a straightforward and trouble-fre process, especially for young paradigms. A case in point was Newton's Laws, which demonstrated tremendously accurate and broad predictive ability but had very few applications when they first were transmitted to the scientific community. So much of the work of Cavendish, Atwood, and others dealt with theoretical considerations pertaining to specific problems encountered in going from the general to the particular -- especially when dealing with problems of precision.(31) "None of those who questioned the validity of Newton's work did so because of its limited agreement with experiment and observation. Nevertheless, these limitations of agreement left many fascinating theoretical problems for Newton's successors....These problems of application account for what is probably the most brilliant and consuming scientific work of the eighteenth century."(32)

(3) Then there are theoretical problems, especially in the mathematically oriented sciences, whose goal is to clarify the paradigm theory by reformulating it "in an equivalent but logically and aesthetically more satisfying form."(33) The example Kuhn gives here involves the work done in electrical theory, but occur in most other sciences as well, some having a more substantial impact on the paradigm theory itself.

The key point we are to see is that the activity of 'normal science' involves the fine-tuning of the paradigm through both empirical and theoretical aspects, but all to the same end. Look at the literature of normal science, Kuhn believes, and you will see that nearly all of it pertains to these classes of problems that he has elucidated: "determination of significant fact, matching of facts with theory, and articulation of the theory."(34) The unusual problems that actually question the foundations of the paradigm are rare, and only emerge when a significant amount of the normal work has been done. Furthermore, there really is no other way to do work under a paradigm; but this is hardly a drawback. Remember how the pre-paradigm scientists were continually forced to prove everything from the ground up, and could not rely on the productive power of institutionalized science which only occurs where the overall theory receives wide support from the community and the social system at large. When people desert the paradigm, they are no longer doing normal science, but rather are on the "pivots about which scientific revolutions turn."(34)2

IV. NORMAL SCIENCE AS PUZZLE-SOLVING

Somewhat surprising for the lay reader is this discovery that normal science concentrates, not on discovering unexpected novelties, but rather clarifying and "mopping up" after the instigation of a new paradigm. Kuhn, however, hardly thinks that this means that scientific work is either uninteresting or unchallenging. On the contrary, the process of normal science often requires great skill and ingenuity; the factual and theoretical investigations listed above call for both technical innovation and clever problem-solving. "Bringing a normal research problem to a conclusion is achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires the solution of all sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical puzzles. The man who succeeds proves himself an expert problem solver, and the challenge of the puzzle is an important part of what usually drives him on."(36)

Kuhn would like to utilize puzzles to describe the nature of normal science. The outcome has little intrinsic importance in comparison to the challange of the process; and a puzzle is only worth doing if it is solvable. Thus, Kuhn suggests, "the really pressing problems, e.g., a cure for cancer or the design of a lasting peace, are often not puzzles at all, largely because they may not have any solution."(37) The paradigm functions to define the problems that are accessible, feasible, and meaningful to pursue. This may mean neglecting certain problems, even those which the society at large deems crucially important and demands answers for, and perhaps passing them on to another discipline.


A paradigm can, for that mater, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies....One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving.(37)


If normal scientific activity is so limited (as the previous encapsulations seem to suggest), why do people show such an interest in the sciences, and devote careers to mop-up work? The puzzle analogy grants, Kuhn believes, a strong psychological rationale for this fact: the desire for challange, one-up-manship, for solving a problem in a unique and better way than others have attempted in the past. "Many of the greatest scientific minds have devoted all of their professional attention to demanding puzzles of this sort. On most occasions any particular field of specialization offers nothing else to do, a fact that makes it no less fascinating to the proper sort of addict."(38) [Is he suggesting that normal scientific activity attracts individuals of a certain pathological nature? Is this justification sound, or perhaps a stereotypical point of view?]

Another more important facet of the puzzle analogy (he uses a jigsaw puzzle) lies in the rule-following nature of scientific work. Not only must the problem be solvable, but "there must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained."(38) Just as there are certain constraints for the manner in which a jigsaw puzzle may be 'solved,' in normal scientific activity there are guidelines and restrictions for both the manner in which factual data are collected and in theoretical problem-solving as well. [Compare this to Boyd's thesis] For example,

The man who builds an instrument to determine optical wave lengths must not be satisfied with a piece of equipment that merely attributes particular numbers to particular spectral lines. He is not just an explorer or measurer. On the contrary, he must show, by analyzing his apparatus in terms of the established body of optical theory, that the numbers his instrument produces are the ones that enter theory as wave lengths....[concerning theoretical problems]...Throughout the eighteenth century thsoe scientist who tried to derive the observed motion of the moon from Newton's laws of motion and gravitation consistently failed to do so. As a result, some of them suggested replacing the inverse square law with a law that deviated from it at small distances. To do that, however, would have been to change the paradigm, to define a new puzzle, and not to solve the old one. In the event, scientists preserved the rules until, in 1750, oneof them discovered how they could successfully be applied.(39)

Such studies help to show what commitments scientists have derived from their paradigms, and, hence, the demonstrate the priority of the paradigm over individual rules. It is important to note, however, that there are more basic guidelines and assumptions which scientists working under a specific paradigm adhere to than particular laws and theories: the types of instrumentation to be used, not to mention how they may be used.(40) "Less local and temporary, though still not unchanging characteristics of science, are the higher level, quasi-metaphysical commitments that historical study so regularly displays."(41) General views about the nature of matter and energy shape both the metaphysical and methodological commitments of scientists (whether, it seems, under a paradigm or not). Even higher, of course, are the views about knowledge and what a responsible person ought to do -- the justifications for engaging in scientific activity in the first place, honest research, and the like. Otherwise a person would not be doing science at all.3

In developing this parallelism between puzzles and normal science we may get the mistaken impression that a paradigm completely defines, sets rules to, and otherwise forces the conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological commits for that science. This is mistaken, Kuhn counters, and will show next that "[t]hough there obviously are rules to which all practitioners of a scientific specialty adhere at a given time, those rules may not by themselves specify all that the practice of those specialists has in common....Rules...derive from paradigms, but paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rules."(42)

V. THE PRIORITY OF PARADIGMS


Whay did Kuhn mean when he said that paradigms could guide research in the absence of rules? He can develop this idea by demonstrating the priority of 'paradigms' over other guiding and binding sorts of things (like 'rules' and 'precedents'). First, from an historical point of view, the paradigms a scientific community shares at a particular time are relatively easy to assess. On the other hand, determining what rules the community shares is much more difficult, for "the historian must compare the community's paradigms with each other and with its current research reports....to discover what isolable elements, explicit or implicit, the members of the community may have abstracted from their more global and deployed rules in their research."(43) This is the difference between the notion of the historian's seeing a subdivision's borrowing from the shared paradigms, and actually defining itself by specific rules. Finding a common group of rules "competent to constitute a given normal research tradition becomes a source of continual and deep frustration."(44)

Frustration leads to reinterpretation: the source of the problem lay in the desire to define by elaborating the exact and exhaustive list of rules which a scientific group follows, whereas, as Kuhn has already set out, the paradigm approach only lays out basic guidelines, but leaves much to be filled in by normal science (the mopping-up work). From the point of view of the scientific community itself (rather than those trying to document its development), members can "agree in their identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization of it. Lack of a standard interpretation or of an agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research. Normal science can be determined in part by the direct inspection of paradigms, a process that is often aided by but does not depend upon the formulation of rules and assumptions."(44)

To make sense of this, Kuhn invokes a Wittgensteinian approach to defining terms and activities through family resemblances rather than universal and commonly held characteristics. Within a certain normal science tradition, the rather narrow class of problems which may be addressed, as well as the techniques available for their solution, are not defined by explicit rules but rather fall into the same general family, which in turn is advised by the paradigm. "They may relate by resemblance and by modeling to one or another part of the scientific corpus which the community in question already recognizes as among its established achievements."(46) That a given topic is determined to be a genuine, answerable question by the field may not necessarily indicate that scientists know how to go about answering it, following specific rules and assumptions; "it may only indicate that neither the question nor the answer is felt to be relevant to their research."(46) Such a point strengthens the thesis that "[p]aradigms may be prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them."(46)

Now let's look at reasons for why this may be the case. Kuhn has four major points, for which he can drawn on empirical and historical evidence.

(1) The problem of finding general rules: just as difficult as finding general properities of anything; thus the move to family resemblances, and away from merely explicit, rule-like statements towards a more encompassing but 'fuzzier' picture. Look at the trouble philosophers have had trying to define, say, 'games.'

(2) The nature of scientifc education: learning concepts and theories is never done without the aide, and immersion into, actual problems and procedures. When new theories are introduced in normal science, they are always related to the class of phenomena to which they apply, not to mention the problem addressed (see the above classifications of normal scientific activity). All along the path of initiation, students continue to work problems relevant to their field.

One is at liberty to suppose that somewhere along the way the scientist has intuitively abstracted rules of the game itself, but there is little reason to believe it. Though many scientists talk easily well about the particular individual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little better than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems and methods. If they have learned such abstractions at all, they show it mainly through their ablility to do successful research. That ability can, however, be understood without recourse to hypothetical rules of the game.(47)

(3) When rules become important: If normal science proceeds enlightened by the general guidelines of the paradigm, and this means taking previous problem-solutions for granted, then we can suppose that, when this stability is undangered, something must take the place of the paradigm's precendents to keep things going. When such a disturbance of the foundations occur, then rules become important. This phenomenon may be observed both in pre-paradigmatic science, and, more importantly, prior to and during a scientific revolution. Examples include the questions raised about the nature and standards of physics, during the transition from Newtonian to quantum mechanics, and the similar controversy with the introduction of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory and statistical mechnanics.(48) The point is that, "[w]hen scientists disagree about whether the fundamental problems of their field have been solved, the search for rules gains a function that it does not ordinarily possess."(48) During normal scientific activity, when the paradigm is securely established and the primary progress is mopping-up, work can proceed without "agreement over rationalization or without any attempted rationalization at all."(49)4

(4) Understanding diversity: The existence of paradigms should not suggest that the entire scientific enterprise is linked together as "a single monolitic and unified enterprise that must stand or fall with any one of its paradigms as well as with all of them together."(49) That would be equating paradigms with rules; paradigms, though they guide specific fields, and may have aspects shared in other fields, need not be taken as applicable as a whole across fields. Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance allows us to recognize the existence of paradigms, or the paradigmatic nature of science in general, without forces us to generate such ranging and universal characteristics. Thus we can explain the diversity of specializations, principles, guiding meta-assumptions, methodologies, questions, and the like, whereas, under a rule-based picture of science, we should assume more uniformity (or chaos). Kuhn assumes that there are plenty of diverse scientific traditions, and goes on to note that a revolution occuring in one often has little impact upon the others, and in particular the actual people in those fields. Quantum mechanics, for example, means different things to the members of different backgrounds, depending upon how it its implications for their science (if any) have been developed in the professional journals and conferences (and hence, how they have filtered down into the textbooks and training programs of the next generation of practicioners).

It follows that, though a change in quantum-mechanical law will be revolutionary for all of these groups, a change that reflects only on one or another of the paradigm applications of quantum mechanics need be revolutionary only for the members of a particular professional subspecialty. For the rest of the profession and for those who practice other physical sciences, that change need not be revolutionary at all. In short, though quantum mechanics (or Newtonian dynamics, or electromagnetic theory) is a paradigm for many scientific groups, it is not the same paradigm for them all. Therefore, it can simultaneously determine several traditions of normal science that overlap without being coextensive.(50)

Under different specializations, there are different concerns and different overall views about the nature of reality. Kuhn relates an anecdotal conversation between two scientists, who give completely different answers to the same question about the nature of helium.(50) Rather than declaring one viewpoint correct and the other incorrect, it is better to assume that "both men were talking about the same particle, but they were viewing it through there own research training and practice,"(51) hence giving opposing answers because their approach to both the question (and, presumably, the manner in answering it) are dependent upon their respective paradigms.

VI. ANOMALY AND THE EMERGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES

Something in the nature of normal scientific activity is very conducive for producing change -- unsuspected phenomena, anomalies, and finally paradigm shifts, while at the same time it "does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none."(52) To understand this paradoxical characteristic, we have to see that change, while not the intention of normal science, necessarily follows from the puzzle-metaphor that has been suggested. "Produced inadvertently by a game played under one set of rules, their assimilation requires the elaboration of another set. After they have become parts of science, the enterprise, at least of those specialists in whose particular field the novelties lie, is never quite the same again."(52)

An analysis of how discoveries and inventions are born and grow will help. First the mistaken notion that these constitute discreet events must be eliminated. Furthermore, even the distinction between discovery (factual change) and invention (theoretical change) turns out to be arbitrary.

Examining selected discoveries...we shall quickly find that they are not isolated events but extended episodes with a regularly recurrent structure. Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science....Assimilating a new sort of fact demands a more than additive adjustment of theory, and until that adjustment is completed -- until the scientists has learned to see nature in a different way -- the new fact is note quite a scientific fact at all.(53)

Taking the 'discovery' of oxygen as a representative example, Kuhn demolishes the notion that there ever existed any particular moment when the discovery occurred. Instead, we need a new vocabulary for talking about such innovations: one leading away from the analogy with seeing. We can keep track of when various scientists have announced the presence of some new phenomenon, but it is not until the relevant conceptual categories are in place relating that phenomenon to the scientific tradition are the 'discovering that' and 'discovering what' coextensive.(56) And this may be merely a matter of clarification and further mop-work, or a revision and questioning of the paradigm. This may answer an earlier question -- why the emphasis on discovery, if that is not what normal science aims at? -- "In this case [oxygen] as in others, the value placed upon a new phenomenon and thus upon its discoverer varies with our estimate of the extent to which the phenomenon violated paradigm-induced anticipations."(56) Kuhn gives three typical sorts of discoveries:

(1) Perception of anomaly: The case of the 'discovery' of oxygen, and that of x-rays, something anticipated had gone awry. Notice, however, that "the perception of anomaly...played an essential role in preparing the way for perception of novelty. But, again in both cases, the perception that something had gone wrong was only the prelude to discovery."(57)

(2) Violating procedures: the observations of x-rays by Roentgen in 1895 did more than upset theoretical expectations -- "they violated deeply entrenched expectations...implicit in the design and interpretation of established laboratory procedures."(59) As the nature of x-rays were fitted into scientific theory, it was realized that a relevant variable which had been previously unrecognized necessitated the reworking of previous work. Paradigm change occurred not only to admit this new phenomenon, but "[i]n the process they denied previously paradigmatic types of instrumentation their right to that title."(59)5 Thus we see that expectations about scientific instruments can affect scientific development, and that part of 'discovery' may include the call for re-evaluating such instruments, for "inevitably they restrict the phenomenological field accessible for scientific investigation at any given time."(61)

(3) Theory-induced discovery: occurs during both the pre-paradigm period and during times of crisis, when provisional hypotheses are suggested to try to clear up the troubles felt under the weakened paradigm. Often these tentative theories, while not the eventual 'solution' to the crisis, point the way; "that discovery is not quite the one anticipated by the speculative and tentative hypothesis. Only as experiment and tentative theory are together articulated to a match does the discovery emerge and the theory become a paradigm."(61) The example given is the Leyden jar, which was created to test a hypothesis that electricity was a fluid, but as anomalies emerged both the apparatus and electrical theory in general evolved, eventually requiring a rethinking of the fluid theory and "thus provided the first full paradigm for electricity."(62)

To account for the slow recognition of new phenomena, and the resistence felt towards both noticing them and then working out their implications on current theory, Kuhn relates a psychological experiment on visual perception as a model.6 It demonstrates that different people require a lesser or greater amount of expose to an intentional visual anomaly, and some people fail to detect it at all (but nevertheless recognize that something is amiss). Kuhn writes,

Either as a metaphor or because it reflects the nature of the mind, that psychological experiment provides a wonderfully simple and cogent schema for the process of scientific discovery. In science, as in the playing card experiment, novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation....That awareness of anomaly opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the initially anomalous has become the anticipated. At this point the discovery has been completed.(64)

Indeed, the extraordinary becomes manifest in relation to the degree of precision with which the paradigm maps onto nature; moreover, in addition to the precise apparatus for measuring the expected, the careful training of the expert is required in order to notice the abnormal. All of these preconditions are provided by the paradigm, and "[t]he more precise and far-reaching the paradigm is, the more sensitive an indicator it provides of anomaly and hence of an occasion for paradigm change."(65) It's no wonder that the same discovery often appears simultaneously in the laboratories of a mature science: it measures both "the strongly traditional nature of normal science and to the completeness with which that traditional pursuit prepares the way for its own change."(65)

VII. CRISIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

Single discoveries, such as the ones considered in the last chapter, usually do not in themselves cause a paradigm shift. So we need an account for theory-innovation, and Kuhn's first suggestion is that "a similar but more profound awareness [of anomaly] is prerequisite to all acceptable changes of theory."(67) But we need more than the recognition of the unexpected: we need a genuine crisis in the field. A suitable science to study is astronomy, for its history is well documented and it experienced many crises and came to maturity long before the other sciences. A slow awareness of puzzle-solving difficulties with the Ptolemaic system led up to a point in the sixteenth century where astronomers like Copernicus were recognizing "that the astronomical paradigm was failing in application to its own traditional problems," and, of course, eventually led to the Copernicus' search for a new paradigm.(69)7 A similar crisis in theory involved the phlogiston theory in chemistry, whose crisis period resembled pre-paradigm science in the many and far-fetched solutions which various thinkers tried to answer to it, pointing out another effect of crisis.(72) The disagreement in physics over motion and the ether, for which Maxwell had attempted to develop solutions based on the Newtonian paradigm, "ultimately produced a crisis for the paradigm from which it had sprung,"(74) and making a puzzle which Einstein would eventually 'solve.' In summation Kuhn writes,

These three examples are almost entirely typical. In each case a novel theory emerged only after a pronounced failure in the normal problem-solving activity....The novel theory seems a direct response to crisis....[and finally] the solution to each of them had been at least partially anticipated during a period when there was no crisis in the corresponding science; and in the absence of crisis those anticipations had been ignored.(75)

As far as the last point is concerned, it is surely plausible, though the only historically accurate example Kuhn produces is Aristarchus' suggestion of a heliocentric astronomical system in the third century B.C. At the time, however, there was no crisis, and hence, Kuhn feels, no confrontation.(75) There was some early critics of Newton, as well, whose recommendations were ignored as well. Large-scale innovation and change in the sciences only occurs during crises, regardless of the 'fact' that philosophers of science are constantly pointing out -- "that more then one theoretical construction can always be placed upon a given collection of data."(76) Kuhn closes the chapter succintly and with a new metaphor for scientific enterprise:

History of science indicates that, particularly in the early developmental stages of a new paradigm, it is not even very difficult to invent such alternatives. But that invention of alternatives is just what scientists seldom undertake except during the pre-paradigm stage of their science's development and at very special occasions during its subsequent evolution. So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear. As in manufacture so in science -- retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it. The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived.(76)

VIII. THE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

Taking for granted that the emergence of new theories is dependent on crises within the scientific community, we proceed to examine the response. The first key point Kuhn argues for is that an anomaly (of whatever sort) is never immediately perceived as a counterexample to the paradigm, although, technically (after the fact) it is. Although on the logical notion of a law (theory, general statement, whatever), a counterexample falsifies, "[n]o process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature."(77) Too much is at stake in a mature science to throw out the theory on account of an apparent counterexample; a new, competing theory or paradigm must replace it, and "the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other."(77) On a deeper level, the anomalies are also counterexamples to epistemological theory -- based on the world as it is portrayed by the paradigm. For Kuhn, then, the most they can do is stir up a crisis which already exists, for "[b]y themselves they cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by anomaly. They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict."(78)8 A paradigm cannot be rejected unless there is an alternative view waiting in the wings, for with no paradgim to follow, Kuhn argues, there is no science. Borrowing from the manufacturing analogy, the science would be bankrupt of any machinery with which to operate, and the individual who does this "will be seen by his colleagues as 'the carpenter who blames his tools.'"(79)9I. INTRODUCTION: A ROLE FOR HISTORY

The image we get from textbooks concerning scientific development has mostly been derived from the perspective of the scientists themselves, of finished acievements. "Inevitably, however, the aim of such books is persuasive and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist brochure."(1) We ought to look at a more historical approach, instead. Yet even historical approaches fail to escape the 'textbook superficiality' when the questions investigated are couched in the theories (and data-gathering techniques) presented in the books -- the picture generated is one in which science is "the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current texts," and scientists are piecemeal contributors.(1) Some modern historians are finding it very difficult to clarify the details under the "accumulation by individual discoveries and inventions" picture of science. More importantly, the distinction between myth and pseudo-science and the current practices is harder to perceive, especially if the theories of the past were considered just as scientific as ours do today: what will future generations say of the present science? This consideration raises serious doubts "about the cumulative process through which these individual contributions to science were thought to have been compounded."(3)

A revolution is occuring in the historiographic study of science; new questions are being asked, and different, less cumulative lines of development are being traced. "Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they attempt to display the historical integrity of that science in its own time."(3) For example, investigating Galileo's views in terms of the science of his time, and the thought and criticism of his contemporaries, rather than against current thinking. Results:

(1) How one does science (the "methodological directives") by itself does not yield the particular conclusions made in different periods. Effective (for the individual as well as the community) are such aspects as prior experience in other fields, idiosyncrasies of the investigations, and individual makeup.(4) Thus there is are many arbitrary elements besides methodology which play a role in the formation of the beliefs of a particular scientific community, at a particular time.

(2) On the other hand, every scientific community holds some basic beliefs, concerning basic entities, interaction among them, what we can ask about them, and how to go about doing it. Today most "mature" sciences have textbooks and institutionalized training, part of which is the inculcation of the specific answersto these questions for that group -- "research as a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education."(5)

(3) Normal science is carried out on the assumption that "the scientific community knows what the world is like."(5) But the novelty (arbitrariness) always remains, however much it is suppressed. Recurring anomalies that cannot be subsumed under the hypotheses of the community at large spark deeper, wider investigations, leading "the profession at last to a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science."(6) These "extraordinary episodes" are the scientific revolutions.

(4) There are many well-known revolutions (Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein), and Kuhn draws some general characteristics.

Each of them necessitated the community's rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it. Each produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as a transformation of the world within which scientific work is done.(6)

(5) We can find these characteristics in other episodes that were not as obviously revolutionary as those listed above. The point is that "a new theory, however special its range of applications, is seldom or never just an increment to what is already know. Its assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory and the re-evaluation of prior fact."(7) The discovery of new scientific facts (like oxygen and x-rays) can have as great an effect on the scientific community as new theories: the world-picture may need to be re-evalutated, as well as experimental procedures, corresponding theories, and the like. Many new discoveries foster revolutionary rethinking, rather than just representing another item of acculumated knowledge.

He goes on to list the problems covered beyond ch. IX, and admits the problems inherent in this sort of investigation. Many of his generalizations are sociological or psychological points about scientists and their communities, though others seem genuinely logical or epistemlogical. He sees the possible circularity of his investigation (9) but proposes to go on, since the enterprise is itself a scientific investigation and the content ought to be discovered "by observing them in application to the data they are meant to elucidate."(9)

II. THE ROUTE TO NORMAL SCIENCE

'Normal Science' is defined as "research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements...that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice."(10) Since the early nineteenth century, science textbooks contained the accepted theories and methodical directives; before that, the great classics (of Aristotle, Ptolemy, Newton, etc.) did this job. All such works possess two essential characteristics which Kuhn outlines: "Their achievements was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity....[while] sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practicioners to resolve."(10) [Consider these points for our problem of what makes a theory 'scientific,' or 'good.' Would a system based on hexes and the like suceed on these two criteria?] Paradigms are those bodies of scientific achievement sharing these two features, and the basic preparation for any new professional amounts to becoming familiar with them.

Because he there joins men who learned the bases of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals....That commitment [to the same basic rules and procedures] and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition.(11)

Examples of paradigms include: Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian dynamics, and wave optics -- but of course there are plenty of specialized and highly dense fields as well. An important point Kuhn would like to prove is that the concrete achievement described in the paradigm is prior to the "concept, laws, theories, and points of view abstracted from it."(11)

Here is a (backwards) summary of the development on the science of light and optics. Today the textbooks tell students that light is photons, a model based on recent research in quantum mechanics. Before Planck, Einstein, and others who developed quantum theory, light was conceived of as "transverse wave motion, a conception rooted in a paradigm that derived ultimately from the optical writings of Young and Fresnel in the early nineteenth century."(12) Prior to that, Newton's Opticks pictured light as material corpuscles rather than as waves. Kuhn characterizes these transformations in the conception of the nature of physical optics as genuine scientific revolutions, and notes that "the successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science."(12) This is different, however, from the theories concerning the nature of light before Newton -- instead of one particular conception being generally held superior to all the others, before the seventeenth century, and stretching back into antiquity, many competing theories existed "in a number of competing schools and subschools, most of them espousing one variant or another of Epicurean, Aristotelian, or Platonic theory."(12) The results of these endeavors do not fit our notion of true 'science:' most of them had to build their field from the foundations upward, and hence their choice of data and methods of experimentation lacked a coherent standard, so that "the dialogue of the resulting books was often directed to the members of other schools as it was to nature."(13) This seems similar to the results of much creative effort today, and discoveries and inventions may spring out of it, but mature sciences present a different character.

He reviews the history of electrical research to better exemplify "the way a science develops before it acquires its first universally accepted paradigm,"(13) and wants us to believe that the histories of most other scientific systems follow this route (with the exception of branches reaching back into prehistory, and specialty fields like biochemistry, which arose out of mature parent systems). For the social sciences it is questionable whether any paradigms have been acquired.

Then there are the difficulties inherent in pre-paradigmatic theories: fact-gathering is pretty random, restricted to the ready-at-hand (no persuasive theoretical reasons to do non-standard detailed investigations), and produces a hodge-podge "morass" of information. "Only very occasionally, as in the cases of ancient statics, dynamics, and geometrical optics, do facts collected with so little guidance from pre-established theory speakwith sufficient clarity to permit the emergence of a first paradigm."(16) Another problem lies in the fact that in order to evaluate, categorize, and criticism, more than "mere facts" are necessary, and in the absence of the guidelines of a paradigm, the structural aspects of the science must come from external sources -- "perhaps by a current metaphysic, by another science, or by personal and historical accident."(17)

Why do the initial divergences disappear as a science matures? The triumph of a school and the establishment of the first paradigm (though, such as in the case of Franklin's theory of electrical attraction, it need not be able to answer all the questions). Then with a mitigation of the "interschool debate" scientists have time and desire to do more involved, time-consuming study; specialize, in a word, and design equipment and procedures for more systematic investigations. Kuhn calls this "highly directed or paradigm-based research."(18)

How does the emergence of a paradigm affect the scientists themselves? Much of the present generation converts, the die-hard holders of the old views are ignored, and the new generation is thus attracted to the new paradigm. Many new sciences become autonomous from the philosophy department, and for many, "the formation of specialized journals, the foundation of specialists' societies, and the claim for a special place in the curriculum" heralds "a group's first reception of a single paradigm."(19) [We can easily extend this notion to academic and professional disciplines in general!] The science becomes more rigidly defined, which has its own advantages for the individual: she no longer has to justify herself and start from the foundations every time she does something (that's what textbooks are for), and she can focus her creative energies where the texts break off, in the "subtlest and most esoteric aspects of the natural phenomena that concerns his group," and share findings and ideas with the specialized group rather than having to speak to the masses (and scientists in other disciplines.(20) He gives examples of when different disciplines "lost" the average reader, and sees a correlation with their flourishing as mature, paradigm-centered sciences. Thus he notes that "although it has become customary, and is surely proper, to deplore the widening gulf that separates the professional scientist from his collegues in other fields, too little attention is paid to the essential relationship between that gulf and the mechanisms intrinsic to scientific advance."(21) [The wrap-up of electricity's rise to maturity (21-22) is a good summation.]

III. THE NATURE OF NORMAL SCIENCE

First let's differentiate our notion of paradigm from the standard: not really a template for replication, but "like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions."(23) At its first appearance a new paradigm has a very limited scope, and is hardly precisely articulated. Remember, paradigms emerge because they work better at solving some problems which the specific scientific community has recognized as acute.(23) They begin with rough edges and need to be honed; as Kuhn puts it,

The success of a paradigm...is at the start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise, and actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm's predicitons, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself.(24)

Normal science procedes after this initial promise has been ratified, so to speak, by the community; Kuhn calls it "mop-up work," and proposes that the laity does not realize the extent to which normal science is just this sort of activity (nor do they see how exciting this work can be, he adds). He makes the empirical claim that the work here centers on"an attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies," rather than seeking to discover new phenomena or formulating new theories. "Mopping-up operations are what engage most scientists throughout their careers....normal scientific research is directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies."(24)

On the first pass this notion is hard to accept. Yet Kuhn asserts that it is only through the narrowing of focus and assumption-granting power of the paradigm that the careful, costly, detailed work that mature science comes about. Science is a social activity which cosumes time, money, and intellectual energy, and requires definition and justification in order to survive; decisions have to be made, and the paradigm offers the necessary guidelines. The foci of both factual and theoretical investigation are quite specific and limited in comparison to the world-inscribing, world-defining undertakings of pre-paradigmatic sciences. Kuhn sees "three normal foci for factual scientifc investigation, and they are neither always nor permanently distinct."(25)

(1) There are facts which, in the terms of the paradigm, tell us important things about the world. Thus they deserve to be better explicated, for they are crucial facets of problem-solving within the paradigm. These include stellar positions, magnitudes, periods for astronomy; specific gravities, wavelengths, boiling points, and the like for physics and chemistry. A good percentage of the experimental and observational literature in a subject is devoted to increasing the accuracy and scope of these facts, not to mention the endeavors made at improving the apparatus for this work.(25)

(2) Making up a much smaller class are factual determinations which represent a direct link between the paradigm theory and the world. These are usually nothing special in themselves, but rather function as a test for predictions -- and "there are seldom many areas in which a scientific theory, particularly if it is cast in a predominantly mathematical form, can be directly compared with nature."(26) Kuhn, in fact, notes only three instances of areas relevant to Einstein's theory of relativity, and for particle physics and other mature sciences, extraordinarly specialized and complicated appartatus is usually required to make the observations. Notice the direct dependence of this kind of factual research upon the paradigm: it not only "sets the problem to be solved; often the paradigm theory is implicated directly in the design of apparatus able to solve the problem."(27)10

(3) Finally there is empirical research which functions "to articulate the paradigm theory, resolving some of its residual ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only drawn attention."(27) This includes determining mathematical constants, like the universal gravitational constant and Avagadro's number. In addition there are the specific quantitative laws that accompany the general overall framework of the paradigm, and, like the above constants, they are hardly the sort of regularities discovered in the rough, Baconian method "found by examinin measurements undertaken for their own sake and without theoretical commitment."(28) A final class of experiments involve the exploration of the qualititive aspects of the paradigm's relation to nature, for "often a paradigm developed for one set of phenomena is ambiguous in its application to other closely related phenomena."(29) The example here deals with the phenomenon of heating by compressionThese sorts of laws and facts appear in every scientific textbook, yet it is often overlooked that they were bought at incredible expense. "Few of these elaborate efforts would have been conceived and none would have been carried out without a paradigm theory to define the problem and to guarantee the existence of a stable solution."(28)

Next are the efforts to elucidate theoretical considerations, all parasitic on the paradigm theory as well, in terms of their mere conceivability, as well as the justification for the effort and expense of their undertaking.

(1) Some theoretical work is devoted simply to making useful predictions while not really extending the scope or elucidation of the paradigm. Such theoretical applications include "[t]he manufacture of astrinomical ephemerides, the computation of lens characteristics, and the production of radio propagation curves." These fairly routine and standardized procedures, however, are generally regarded by scientists "as hack work to be relegated to engineers or technicians."(30)

(2) Other manipulations of the theory do find a place in mainstream research and are published in scientific journals, but not for practical purposes but rather "to display a new application of the paradigm or to increase the precision of an application that has already been made."(30) Developing points of contact between theory and nature is seldom a straightforward and trouble-fre process, especially for young paradigms. A case in point was Newton's Laws, which demonstrated tremendously accurate and broad predictive ability but had very few applications when they first were transmitted to the scientific community. So much of the work of Cavendish, Atwood, and others dealt with theoretical considerations pertaining to specific problems encountered in going from the general to the particular -- especially when dealing with problems of precision.(31) "None of those who questioned the validity of Newton's work did so because of its limited agreement with experiment and observation. Nevertheless, these limitations of agreement left many fascinating theoretical problems for Newton's successors....These problems of application account for what is probably the most brilliant and consuming scientific work of the eighteenth century."(32)

(3) Then there are theoretical problems, especially in the mathematically oriented sciences, whose goal is to clarify the paradigm theory by reformulating it "in an equivalent but logically and aesthetically more satisfying form."(33) The example Kuhn gives here involves the work done in electrical theory, but occur in most other sciences as well, some having a more substantial impact on the paradigm theory itself.

The key point we are to see is that the activity of 'normal science' involves the fine-tuning of the paradigm through both empirical and theoretical aspects, but all to the same end. Look at the literature of normal science, Kuhn believes, and you will see that nearly all of it pertains to these classes of problems that he has elucidated: "determination of significant fact, matching of facts with theory, and articulation of the theory."(34) The unusual problems that actually question the foundations of the paradigm are rare, and only emerge when a significant amount of the normal work has been done. Furthermore, there really is no other way to do work under a paradigm; but this is hardly a drawback. Remember how the pre-paradigm scientists were continually forced to prove everything from the ground up, and could not rely on the productive power of institutionalized science which only occurs where the overall theory receives wide support from the community and the social system at large. When people desert the paradigm, they are no longer doing normal science, but rather are on the "pivots about which scientific revolutions turn."(34)11

IV. NORMAL SCIENCE AS PUZZLE-SOLVING

Somewhat surprising for the lay reader is this discovery that normal science concentrates, not on discovering unexpected novelties, but rather clarifying and "mopping up" after the instigation of a new paradigm. Kuhn, however, hardly thinks that this means that scientific work is either uninteresting or unchallenging. On the contrary, the process of normal science often requires great skill and ingenuity; the factual and theoretical investigations listed above call for both technical innovation and clever problem-solving. "Bringing a normal research problem to a conclusion is achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires the solution of all sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical puzzles. The man who succeeds proves himself an expert problem solver, and the challenge of the puzzle is an important part of what usually drives him on."(36)

Kuhn would like to utilize puzzles to describe the nature of normal science. The outcome has little intrinsic importance in comparison to the challange of the process; and a puzzle is only worth doing if it is solvable. Thus, Kuhn suggests, "the really pressing problems, e.g., a cure for cancer or the design of a lasting peace, are often not puzzles at all, largely because they may not have any solution."(37) The paradigm functions to define the problems that are accessible, feasible, and meaningful to pursue. This may mean neglecting certain problems, even those which the society at large deems crucially important and demands answers for, and perhaps passing them on to another discipline.

A paradigm can, for that mater, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies....One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving.(37)

If normal scientific activity is so limited (as the previous encapsulations seem to suggest), why do people show such an interest in the sciences, and devote careers to mop-up work? The puzzle analogy grants, Kuhn believes, a strong psychological rationale for this fact: the desire for challange, one-up-manship, for solving a problem in a unique and better way than others have attempted in the past. "Many of the greatest scientific minds have devoted all of their professional attention to demanding puzzles of this sort. On most occasions any particular field of specialization offers nothing else to do, a fact that makes it no less fascinating to the proper sort of addict."(38) [Is he suggesting that normal scientific activity attracts individuals of a certain pathological nature? Is this justification sound, or perhaps a stereotypical point of view?]

Another more important facet of the puzzle analogy (he uses a jigsaw puzzle) lies in the rule-following nature of scientific work. Not only must the problem be solvable, but "there must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained."(38) Just as there are certain constraints for the manner in which a jigsaw puzzle may be 'solved,' in normal scientific activity there are guidelines and restrictions for both the manner in which factual data are collected and in theoretical problem-solving as well. [Compare this to Boyd's thesis] For example,

The man who builds an instrument to determine optical wave lengths must not be satisfied with a piece of equipment that merely attributes particular numbers to particular spectral lines. He is not just an explorer or measurer. On the contrary, he must show, by analyzing his apparatus in terms of the established body of optical theory, that the numbers his instrument produces are the ones that enter theory as wave lengths....[concerning theoretical problems]...Throughout the eighteenth century thsoe scientist who tried to derive the observed motion of the moon from Newton's laws of motion and gravitation consistently failed to do so. As a result, some of them suggested replacing the inverse square law with a law that deviated from it at small distances. To do that, however, would have been to change the paradigm, to define a new puzzle, and not to solve the old one. In the event, scientists preserved the rules until, in 1750, oneof them discovered how they could successfully be applied.(39)

Such studies help to show what commitments scientists have derived from their paradigms, and, hence, the demonstrate the priority of the paradigm over individual rules. It is important to note, however, that there are more basic guidelines and assumptions which scientists working under a specific paradigm adhere to than particular laws and theories: the types of instrumentation to be used, not to mention how they may be used.(40) "Less local and temporary, though still not unchanging characteristics of science, are the higher level, quasi-metaphysical commitments that historical study so regularly displays."(41) General views about the nature of matter and energy shape both the metaphysical and methodological commitments of scientists (whether, it seems, under a paradigm or not). Even higher, of course, are the views about knowledge and what a responsible person ought to do -- the justifications for engaging in scientific activity in the first place, honest research, and the like. Otherwise a person would not be doing science at all.12

In developing this parallelism between puzzles and normal science we may get the mistaken impression that a paradigm completely defines, sets rules to, and otherwise forces the conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological commits for that science. This is mistaken, Kuhn counters, and will show next that "[t]hough there obviously are rules to which all practitioners of a scientific specialty adhere at a given time, those rules may not by themselves specify all that the practice of those specialists has in common....Rules...derive from paradigms, but paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rules."(42)

V. THE PRIORITY OF PARADIGMS

What did Kuhn mean when he said that paradigms could guide research in the absence of rules? He can develop this idea by demonstrating the priority of 'paradigms' over other guiding and binding sorts of things (like 'rules' and 'precedents'). First, from an historical point of view, the paradigms a scientific community shares at a particular time are relatively easy to assess. On the other hand, determining what rules the community shares is much more difficult, for "the historian must compare the community's paradigms with each other and with its current research reports....to discover what isolable elements, explicit or implicit, the members of the community may have abstracted from their more global and deployed rules in their research."(43) This is the difference between the notion of the historian's seeing a subdivision's borrowing from the shared paradigms, and actually defining itself by specific rules. Finding a common group of rules "competent to constitute a given normal research tradition becomes a source of continual and deep frustration."(44)

Frustration leads to reinterpretation: the source of the problem lay in the desire to define by elaborating the exact and exhaustive list of rules which a scientific group follows, whereas, as Kuhn has already set out, the paradigm approach only lays out basic guidelines, but leaves much to be filled in by normal science (the mopping-up work). From the point of view of the scientific community itself (rather than those trying to document its development), members can "agree in their identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization of it. Lack of a standard interpretation or of an agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research. Normal science can be determined in part by the direct inspection of paradigms, a process that is often aided by but does not depend upon the formulation of rules and assumptions."(44)

To make sense of this, Kuhn invokes a Wittgensteinian approach to defining terms and activities through family resemblances rather than universal and commonly held characteristics. Within a certain normal science tradition, the rather narrow class of problems which may be addressed, as well as the techniques available for their solution, are not defined by explicit rules but rather fall into the same general family, which in turn is advised by the paradigm. "They may relate by resemblance and by modeling to one or another part of the scientific corpus which the community in question already recognizes as among its established achievements."(46) That a given topic is determined to be a genuine, answerable question by the field may not necessarily indicate that scientists know how to go about answering it, following specific rules and assumptions; "it may only indicate that neither the question nor the answer is felt to be relevant to their research."(46) Such a point strengthens the thesis that "[p]aradigms may be prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them."(46)

Now let's look at reasons for why this may be the case. Kuhn has four major points, for which he can drawn on empirical and historical evidence.

(1) The problem of finding general rules: just as difficult as finding general properities of anything; thus the move to family resemblances, and away from merely explicit, rule-like statements towards a more encompassing but 'fuzzier' picture. Look at the trouble philosophers have had trying to define, say, 'games.'

(2) The nature of scientifc education: learning concepts and theories is never done without the aide, and immersion into, actual problems and procedures. When new theories are introduced in normal science, they are always related to the class of phenomena to which they apply, not to mention the problem addressed (see the above classifications of normal scientific activity). All along the path of initiation, students continue to work problems relevant to their field.

One is at liberty to suppose that somewhere along the way the scientist has intuitively abstracted rules of the game itself, but there is little reason to believe it. Though many scientists talk easily well about the particular individual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little better than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems and methods. If they have learned such abstractions at all, they show it mainly through their ablility to do successful research. That ability can, however, be understood without recourse to hypothetical rules of the game.(47)

(3) When rules become important: If normal science proceeds enlightened by the general guidelines of the paradigm, and this means taking previous problem-solutions for granted, then we can suppose that, when this stability is undangered, something must take the place of the paradigm's precendents to keep things going. When such a disturbance of the foundations occur, then rules become important. This phenomenon may be observed both in pre-paradigmatic science, and, more importantly, prior to and during a scientific revolution. Examples include the questions raised about the nature and standards of physics, during the transition from Newtonian to quantum mechanics, and the similar controversy with the introduction of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory and statistical mechnanics.(48) The point is that, "[w]hen scientists disagree about whether the fundamental problems of their field have been solved, the search for rules gains a function that it does not ordinarily possess."(48) During normal scientific activity, when the paradigm is securely established and the primary progress is mopping-up, work can proceed without "agreement over rationalization or without any attempted rationalization at all."(49)13

(4) Understanding diversity: The existence of paradigms should not suggest that the entire scientific enterprise is linked together as "a single monolitic and unified enterprise that must stand or fall with any one of its paradigms as well as with all of them together."(49) That would be equating paradigms with rules; paradigms, though they guide specific fields, and may have aspects shared in other fields, need not be taken as applicable as a whole across fields. Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance allows us to recognize the existence of paradigms, or the paradigmatic nature of science in general, without forces us to generate such ranging and universal characteristics. Thus we can explain the diversity of specializations, principles, guiding meta-assumptions, methodologies, questions, and the like, whereas, under a rule-based picture of science, we should assume more uniformity (or chaos). Kuhn assumes that there are plenty of diverse scientific traditions, and goes on to note that a revolution occuring in one often has little impact upon the others, and in particular the actual people in those fields. Quantum mechanics, for example, means different things to the members of different backgrounds, depending upon how it its implications for their science (if any) have been developed in the professional journals and conferences (and hence, how they have filtered down into the textbooks and training programs of the next generation of practicioners).

It follows that, though a change in quantum-mechanical law will be revolutionary for all of these groups, a change that reflects only on one or another of the paradigm applications of quantum mechanics need be revolutionary only for the members of a particular professional subspecialty. For the rest of the profession and for those who practice other physical sciences, that change need not be revolutionary at all. In short, though quantum mechanics (or Newtonian dynamics, or electromagnetic theory) is a paradigm for many scientific groups, it is not the same paradigm for them all. Therefore, it can simultaneously determine several traditions of normal science that overlap without being coextensive.(50)

Under different specializations, there are different concerns and different overall views about the nature of reality. Kuhn relates an anecdotal conversation between two scientists, who give completely different answers to the same question about the nature of helium.(50) Rather than declaring one viewpoint correct and the other incorrect, it is better to assume that "both men were talking about the same particle, but they were viewing it through there own research training and practice,"(51) hence giving opposing answers because their approach to both the question (and, presumably, the manner in answering it) are dependent upon their respective paradigms.

VI. ANOMALY AND THE EMERGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES

Something in the nature of normal scientific activity is very conducive for producing change -- unsuspected phenomena, anomalies, and finally paradigm shifts, while at the same time it "does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none."(52) To understand this paradoxical characteristic, we have to see that change, while not the intention of normal science, necessarily follows from the puzzle-metaphor that has been suggested. "Produced inadvertently by a game played under one set of rules, their assimilation requires the elaboration of another set. After they have become parts of science, the enterprise, at least of those specialists in whose particular field the novelties lie, is never quite the same again."(52)

An analysis of how discoveries and inventions are born and grow will help. First the mistaken notion that these constitute discreet events must be eliminated. Furthermore, even the distinction between discovery (factual change) and invention (theoretical change) turns out to be arbitrary.

Examining selected discoveries...we shall quickly find that they are not isolated events but extended episodes with a regularly recurrent structure. Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science....Assimilating a new sort of fact demands a more than additive adjustment of theory, and until that adjustment is completed -- until the scientists has learned to see nature in a different way -- the new fact is note quite a scientific fact at all.(53)

Taking the 'discovery' of oxygen as a representative example, Kuhn demolishes the notion that there ever existed any particular moment when the discovery occurred. Instead, we need a new vocabulary for talking about such innovations: one leading away from the analogy with seeing. We can keep track of when various scientists have announced the presence of some new phenomenon, but it is not until the relevant conceptual categories are in place relating that phenomenon to the scientific tradition are the 'discovering that' and 'discovering what' coextensive.(56) And this may be merely a matter of clarification and further mop-work, or a revision and questioning of the paradigm. This may answer an earlier question -- why the emphasis on discovery, if that is not what normal science aims at? -- "In this case [oxygen] as in others, the value placed upon a new phenomenon and thus upon its discoverer varies with our estimate of the extent to which the phenomenon violated paradigm-induced anticipations."(56) Kuhn gives three typical sorts of discoveries:

(1) Perception of anomaly: The case of the 'discovery' of oxygen, and that of x-rays, something anticipated had gone awry. Notice, however, that "the perception of anomaly...played an essential role in preparing the way for perception of novelty. But, again in both cases, the perception that something had gone wrong was only the prelude to discovery."(57)

(2) Violating procedures: the observations of x-rays by Roentgen in 1895 did more than upset theoretical expectations -- "they violated deeply entrenched expectations...implicit in the design and interpretation of established laboratory procedures."(59) As the nature of x-rays were fitted into scientific theory, it was realized that a relevant variable which had been previously unrecognized necessitated the reworking of previous work. Paradigm change occurred not only to admit this new phenomenon, but "[i]n the process they denied previously paradigmatic types of instrumentation their right to that title."(59)14 Thus we see that expectations about scientific instruments can affect scientific development, and that part of 'discovery' may include the call for re-evaluating such instruments, for "inevitably they restrict the phenomenological field accessible for scientific investigation at any given time."(61)

(3) Theory-induced discovery: occurs during both the pre-paradigm period and during times of crisis, when provisional hypotheses are suggested to try to clear up the troubles felt under the weakened paradigm. Often these tentative theories, while not the eventual 'solution' to the crisis, point the way; "that discovery is not quite the one anticipated by the speculative and tentative hypothesis. Only as experiment and tentative theory are together articulated to a match does the discovery emerge and the theory become a paradigm."(61) The example given is the Leyden jar, which was created to test a hypothesis that electricity was a fluid, but as anomalies emerged both the apparatus and electrical theory in general evolved, eventually requiring a rethinking of the fluid theory and "thus provided the first full paradigm for electricity."(62)

To account for the slow recognition of new phenomena, and the resistence felt towards both noticing them and then working out their implications on current theory, Kuhn relates a psychological experiment on visual perception as a model.15 It demonstrates that different people require a lesser or greater amount of expose to an intentional visual anomaly, and some people fail to detect it at all (but nevertheless recognize that something is amiss). Kuhn writes,

Either as a metaphor or because it reflects the nature of the mind, that psychological experiment provides a wonderfully simple and cogent schema for the process of scientific discovery. In science, as in the playing card experiment, novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation....That awareness of anomaly opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the initially anomalous has become the anticipated. At this point the discovery has been completed.(64)

Indeed, the extraordinary becomes manifest in relation to the degree of precision with which the paradigm maps onto nature; moreover, in addition to the precise apparatus for measuring the expected, the careful training of the expert is required in order to notice the abnormal. All of these preconditions are provided by the paradigm, and "[t]he more precise and far-reaching the paradigm is, the more sensitive an indicator it provides of anomaly and hence of an occasion for paradigm change."(65) It's no wonder that the same discovery often appears simultaneously in the laboratories of a mature science: it measures both "the strongly traditional nature of normal science and to the completeness with which that traditional pursuit prepares the way for its own change."(65)

VII. CRISIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

Single discoveries, such as the ones considered in the last chapter, usually do not in themselves cause a paradigm shift. So we need an account for theory-innovation, and Kuhn's first suggestion is that "a similar but more profound awareness [of anomaly] is prerequisite to all acceptable changes of theory."(67) But we need more than the recognition of the unexpected: we need a genuine crisis in the field. A suitable science to study is astronomy, for its history is well documented and it experienced many crises and came to maturity long before the other sciences. A slow awareness of puzzle-solving difficulties with the Ptolemaic system led up to a point in the sixteenth century where astronomers like Copernicus were recognizing "that the astronomical paradigm was failing in application to its own traditional problems," and, of course, eventually led to the Copernicus' search for a new paradigm.(69)16 A similar crisis in theory involved the phlogiston theory in chemistry, whose crisis period resembled pre-paradigm science in the many and far-fetched solutions which various thinkers tried to answer to it, pointing out another effect of crisis.(72) The disagreement in physics over motion and the ether, for which Maxwell had attempted to develop solutions based on the Newtonian paradigm, "ultimately produced a crisis for the paradigm from which it had sprung,"(74) and making a puzzle which Einstein would eventually 'solve.' In summation Kuhn writes,

These three examples are almost entirely typical. In each case a novel theory emerged only after a pronounced failure in the normal problem-solving activity....The novel theory seems a direct response to crisis....[and finally] the solution to each of them had been at least partially anticipated during a period when there was no crisis in the corresponding science; and in the absence of crisis those anticipations had been ignored.(75)

As far as the last point is concerned, it is surely plausible, though the only historically accurate example Kuhn produces is Aristarchus' suggestion of a heliocentric astronomical system in the third century B.C. At the time, however, there was no crisis, and hence, Kuhn feels, no confrontation.(75) There was some early critics of Newton, as well, whose recommendations were ignored as well. Large-scale innovation and change in the sciences only occurs during crises, regardless of the 'fact' that philosophers of science are constantly pointing out -- "that more then one theoretical construction can always be placed upon a given collection of data."(76) Kuhn closes the chapter succintly and with a new metaphor for scientific enterprise:

History of science indicates that, particularly in the early developmental stages of a new paradigm, it is not even very difficult to invent such alternatives. But that invention of alternatives is just what scientists seldom undertake except during the pre-paradigm stage of their science's development and at very special occasions during its subsequent evolution. So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear. As in manufacture so in science -- retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it. The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived.(76)

VIII. THE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

Taking for granted that the emergence of new theories is dependent on crises within the scientific community, we proceed to examine the response. The first key point Kuhn argues for is that an anomaly (of whatever sort) is never immediately perceived as a counterexample to the paradigm, although, technically (after the fact) it is. Although on the logical notion of a law (theory, general statement, whatever), a counterexample falsifies, "[n]o process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature."(77) Too much is at stake in a mature science to throw out the theory on account of an apparent counterexample; a new, competing theory or paradigm must replace it, and "the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other."(77) On a deeper level, the anomalies are also counterexamples to epistemological theory -- based on the world as it is portrayed by the paradigm. For Kuhn, then, the most they can do is stir up a crisis which already exists, for "[b]y themselves they cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by anomaly. They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict."(78)17 A paradigm cannot be rejected unless there is an alternative view waiting in the wings, for with no paradgim to follow, Kuhn argues, there is no science. The individual who does this "will be seen by his colleagues as 'the carpenter who blames his tools.'"(79)18

Latour will call these hybrids and argue that they result from trying to adhere to the so-called modernist principles; the facts, the deferral of explanation defying accepted theories multiply with even more hybrids and anomalies receiving special explanations, like programming hacks, reveal that we have never been modern.



1Obviously this is not to say that the confirmation of the theories empirical adequacy is so tied into the theory itself that the test is question-begging. But there is no doubt that such devices as super colliders and underground nuclear test chambers would never have been conceived without the guidance of the paradigm theory.

2A good example of normal scientific activity was 'filling up' the gaps in the periodic table in the last century, and the discoveries made were "an occasion only for congratulations, not for surprise."(58) Compare this to the sense of "discovery" later in the book.

3No mention is made of explicit ethical concerns for the scientist outside of what the paradigm recommends ought to be studied, and how honest research may progress.

4This characterization portrays the 'conscience' of the normal, healthy, paradigm-based scientific community as lack when there is plenty of straightforward work to do, and only becomes self-reflexive during times of crisis, mostly when members believe they have completed the mopping-up.

5Tie into the notion of relativity of Boyd's explanation of empirical adequacy: it's not whether, once and for all...but rather...

6see J.S.Bruner and Leo Postman, "On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm," Journal of Personality, XVIII (1949), 206-23.

7Kuhn notes that many social issues were highly relevant in the astronomical revolution, and obviously play a role in other scientific revolutions as well, but "technical breakdown would still remain the core of the crisis."(69) For a mature science, he suggests, social issues primarily affect "the timing of breakdown, the ease with which it can be recognized, and the area in which, because it is give particular attention, the breakdown first occurs."(69) But these issues go beyond the bounds of the text.

8This says something about the status of "facts" in mature science, including the apparent anomalies. They are not really contingent phenomenological statements, but rather "very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise,"(78) as soon as their proper 'fit' into the world has been articulated by the paradigm.

9This seems to apply, of course, to mature science, but in another sense the statement seems trivial: one would be throwing out a conceptual system and replacing it with...with what? No conceptual system at all?

10Obviously this is not to say that the confirmation of the theories empirical adequacy is so tied into the theory itself that the test is question-begging. But there is no doubt that such devices as super colliders and underground nuclear test chambers would never have been conceived without the guidance of the paradigm theory.

11A good example of normal scientific activity was 'filling up' the gaps in the periodic table in the last century, and the discoveries made were "an occasion only for congratulations, not for surprise."(58) Compare this to the sense of "discovery" later in the book.

12No mention is made of explicit ethical concerns for the scientist outside of what the paradigm recommends ought to be studied, and how honest research may progress.

13This characterization portrays the 'conscience' of the normal, healthy, paradigm-based scientific community as lack when there is plenty of straightforward work to do, and only becomes self-reflexive during times of crisis, mostly when members believe they have completed the mopping-up.

14Tie into the notion of relativity of Boyd's explanation of empirical adequacy: it's not whether, once and for all...but rather...

15see J.S.Bruner and Leo Postman, "On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm," Journal of Personality, XVIII (1949), 206-23.

16Kuhn notes that many social issues were highly relevant in the astronomical revolution, and obviously play a role in other scientific revolutions as well, but "technical breakdown would still remain the core of the crisis."(69) For a mature science, he suggests, social issues primarily affect "the timing of breakdown, the ease with which it can be recognized, and the area in which, because it is give particular attention, the breakdown first occurs."(69) But these issues go beyond the bounds of the text.

17This says something about the status of "facts" in mature science, including the apparent anomalies. They are not really contingent phenomenological statements, but rather "very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise,"(78) as soon as their proper 'fit' into the world has been articulated by the paradigm.

18This seems to apply, of course, to mature science, but in another sense the statement seems trivial: one would be throwing out a conceptual system and replacing it with...with what? No conceptual system at all?